Safer Streets Fund – Crime Prevention toolkit
January 2020
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About the Safer Streets Fund toolkit

This document supports delivery of the Safer Streets Fund, a Home Office Fund worth £25m in 20/21. The Safer Streets Fund will provide funding to residential areas within England and Wales that are disproportionately affected by acquisitive crime, to invest in evidence-based situational interventions. The aims of the fund are to:

- Reduce acquisitive crime in areas that receive funding – making residents safer and removing demand from the system to enable police to focus on more complex crimes.
- Build evidence about the impact of targeted investment in situational prevention in high crime areas to strengthen the case for future investment, both at a local and national level.
- Grow local capability to undertake data driven problem solving and capture evidence and practical learning about how best to implement situational interventions to prevent crime.

In designing their bids for funding, areas are encouraged to take a problem-solving approach, identifying interventions that fit the specific issues of a local area and those with a strong evidence base. This toolkit aims to support areas to take an evidence-based approach as they develop their bids for the fund, by bringing together existing evidence and resources. They also contain important implementation considerations to support areas to develop deliverable plans. These toolkits represent an initial assessment of available information, based on input from a wide range of subject matter experts and should not be viewed as a definitive guide. We welcome feedback on the content of the toolkits, which can be sent to saferstreets@homeoffice.gov.uk.

For further details on applying for the Safer Streets Fund please consult the Safer Streets page: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/safer-streets-fund-application-process

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1 For the purposes of the fund this is defined as the police.uk categories of bicycle theft, burglary, other theft, robbery, shoplifting, theft from the person and vehicle crime. Where areas target a range of acquisitive crimes.

2 The reference group is listed on the earlier page.
Introduction

Evidence\(^3\) has shown that by using a structured process to understand and tackle the root causes of local problems, the police can reduce crime and disorder overall and in a variety of situations. Tools that can be of help in analysing problems include:

- SARA [https://popcenter.asu.edu/content/sara-model-1](https://popcenter.asu.edu/content/sara-model-1);
- The Problem Triangle (PAT) [https://popcenter.asu.edu/content/problem-analysis-triangle-0](https://popcenter.asu.edu/content/problem-analysis-triangle-0).


This toolkit provides support for identifying the problem to tackle and the interventions that could be used to reduce it. In line with this, the Safer Streets application questions follow the SARA method of problem-solving Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment. For each of these aspects of problems solving the links to the toolkits provide further information.

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\(^3\) [http://library.college.police.uk/docs/what-works/What-works-briefing-POP-2013.pdf](http://library.college.police.uk/docs/what-works/What-works-briefing-POP-2013.pdf)
Scanning - where to target?
The following resources and questions may help to identify the areas that will benefit most from the Safer Streets Fund. In selecting their target area, PCCs should also consult the Safer Streets application guidance which has further information about eligibility for funding.

## Resources

| To see national trends and analysis of acquisitive crime | For ONS data on burglary and household theft, click [here](#)  
For ONS data on vehicle crime, click [here](#) |
|----------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
| To see evidence on the factors that increase the risk of acquisitive crime | Domestic burglary summary click [here](#)  
Vehicle crime summary click [here](#)  
Cycle crime summary click [here](#) |
| To identify hotspots based on burglary data. | A domestic burglary mapping tool has been developed by Nottingham Trent University. You will be able to access the regional maps via a dedicated link [here](#) provided you are logged in to the Police Knowledge Hub  
This will allow you to filter down the data displayed on the map by police force, community safety partnership and local authority district. |
Analysis – what is the problem?

Key Resources

| The Problem-Solving and Demand Knowledge Hub | The National Problem-Solving and Demand Reduction Programme is a three-year programme of work that has been established by South Yorkshire Police after the force was awarded £6.35 million of funding from the Police Transformation Fund. The programme, launched in 2017, aims to transform ways of working across the police at a local, regional and national level by embedding problem-solving as a core discipline. As part of its work it stabled the knowledge hub.  
*note: you will need to be logged into the Police Knowledge Hub for the link to work*
|---|---|
| The US Pop Center | The Center for Problem-Oriented Policing is an American non-profit organisation dedicated to studying and advancing problem-oriented policing. It consists of police practitioners, universities, and scholars studying policing. It has a series of toolkits, guidance and best practice guides for addressing common crime and disorder problems.
| Repeat victimisation calculator | For a repeat victimisation calculator that provides an easy way to understand repeat victimisation rates, click [here](#).
| UCL JDI briefs analysis support | JDibrief is an online library of one-page briefing notes about crime and security problems, and analytical techniques that can be applied to understand them.
| Case studies of problem-oriented policing | Click here for a series of case studies that illustrate the identification and tackling of problems. The majority are taken from successful Tilley or Goldstein award entries. |
### Case Studies: examples of Tilley and Goldstein Award winners and finalists for acquisitive crime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Tactic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chula Vista Burglary project</td>
<td>US, Chula Vista</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Residential burglary</td>
<td>Target hardening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durham, Burglary</td>
<td>UK, Durham</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Residential burglary</td>
<td>Safer homes packs including property marking, target hardening including lighting timers, Neighbourhood Watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Road to Reduction - Disrupting the optimal forager</td>
<td>UK, Greater Manchester</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Residential burglary</td>
<td>Predictive mapping and super-cocooning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hopwood Triangle - revitalising a depressed neighbourhood in Lancashire</td>
<td>UK, Lancashire</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Residential burglary, prostitution, anti-social behaviour</td>
<td>Environmental design (CPTED), Neighbourhood Watch, repeat victimisation, improved lighting, CCTV, identification of problem tenants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nowhere to run Nowhere to hide - neighbourhood burglary reduction</td>
<td>UK, Staffordshire</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Residential burglary</td>
<td>Alley-gating, targeting offenders with drug treatment and rehabilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Kirkholt burglary prevention project 1</td>
<td>UK, Rochdale</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Residential burglary</td>
<td>Repeat victimisation, target hardening, property marking, Neighbourhood Watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe as Houses</td>
<td>UK, Enfield</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Residential burglary</td>
<td>Alley-gating, target hardening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Name</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Crime Type</td>
<td>Measures Taken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winnipeg auto-theft suppression</td>
<td>Canada, Winnipeg</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Car theft</td>
<td>Target hardening through immobilisers and working with high risk youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing vehicle burglaries</td>
<td>US, Texas</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Car theft</td>
<td>Awareness raising, improving surveillance by cutting back vegetation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Cobra</td>
<td>UK, Portsmouth</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Car theft</td>
<td>Awareness raising, property marking, offender focus using enhanced forensics and intelligence gathering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Fragment</td>
<td>UK, Bristol</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Metal theft</td>
<td>Vehicle stop checks, awareness raising, SLAs with local dealers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiregreen Alliance</td>
<td>UK, South Yorkshire</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Metal theft from residential homes</td>
<td>Property marking, target hardening, mobile CCTV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing cycle theft: A partnership approach between Transport for London and the MPS</td>
<td>UK, London</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Cycle theft</td>
<td>Cycle marking and registration, hotspot policing, working with online sites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery of School aged victims in Enfield</td>
<td>UK, Enfield</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>Awareness raising, ASBOs, staggered school closing, stolen goods market</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Response

Below is a table that summarises many of the key tactics that can be used in reducing acquisitive crime. Fuller details for each tactic are available further down in the toolkit. The summary details provided relate to some of the key factors to consider when determining whether the tactic is appropriate for implementation using the funding from the Safer Streets Fund.

It can be helpful to consider the response to a crime problem as three distinct tasks:

- Intervention – the tactic aimed to block the causes of criminal events;
- Implementation - practical tasks to make the Intervention happen; and
- Involvement - mobilising, partnering with and setting the climate for people and organisations to take on crime prevention roles/responsibilities, including implementing and supporting the Interventions.

### Situational crime prevention responses: summary table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tactic</th>
<th>Evidence and impact</th>
<th>Crimes targeted</th>
<th>Cost[^5]</th>
<th>Difficulty/Lead in time</th>
<th>Sustainability issues</th>
<th>Implementation considerations</th>
<th>Further information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target hardening - improve home security measures</td>
<td>Strong evidence of a positive crime reduction impact based on multiple evaluations and</td>
<td>Domestic burglary</td>
<td>£ - £££££</td>
<td>Lead in: short</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Owners of housing stock must be involved</td>
<td>Click: Home_security_measures for more information and evidence on specific methods of</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[^5]: Key to costs: £ = £1 - £100, ££ = £101 - £250, £££ = £251 - £1000, ££££ = £1001 - £5000, £££££ = £5001+

[^4]: Evidence coding – String refers to systematic review or multiple high quality experimental studies, Moderate refers to multiple experimental studies where one has a control, Limited refers to qualitative evidence such as interviews or case studies only.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Access and movement control</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Home security improvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alley-gating</strong></td>
<td>Strong evidence of a positive crime reduction effect from systematic review evidence</td>
<td>Domestic burglary, littering</td>
<td>££££</td>
<td>Lead in: medium</td>
<td>Some ongoing maintenance of the gates may be required</td>
<td>Consultation with residents required and early consultation with the relevant local authority or housing association and legal issues Works best in stable neighbourhoods where residents will keep gates locked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Compartmentation</strong> (the sub-division of multi-occupancy dwellings e.g. blocks of flats to control access)</td>
<td>Limited evidence of a positive crime reduction impact</td>
<td>Domestic burglary, antisocial behaviour</td>
<td>££££ Involves the implementation of access control systems in multi-occupancy buildings</td>
<td>Lead in: short</td>
<td>Some ongoing administration will be required to ensure availability of keys etc</td>
<td>Consultation and support from residents is important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interview data only</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Difficulty: medium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Enhancing defensible space and demarcation</strong></td>
<td>Limited evidence of a positive crime reduction impact</td>
<td>Domestic burglary</td>
<td>££ Involves adding/improving fences and gates</td>
<td>Lead in: short</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Consultation with residents is important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention</td>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>Problem</td>
<td>Lead in</td>
<td>Difficulty</td>
<td>Feasibility</td>
<td>Information on this intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads, footpaths and subways</td>
<td>Moderate evidence of a positive crime reduction impact</td>
<td>Domestic burglary, robbery anti-social behaviour, drugs offences</td>
<td>££££</td>
<td>med – long</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Are the changes/improvements feasible given budgets and time constraints? Click: <a href="#">Roads_footpaths_and_subways</a> for more information on this intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase Surveillance</td>
<td>Street lighting</td>
<td>Strong evidence of a positive crime reduction impact</td>
<td>Domestic burglary, robbery, violent crime</td>
<td>££££</td>
<td>med – long</td>
<td>Some ongoing maintenance required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCTV</td>
<td>Strong evidence of a positive crime reduction impact in car parks</td>
<td>Vehicle crime</td>
<td>££££</td>
<td>short</td>
<td>CCTV costs are ongoing, so it is important to consider maintenance and monitoring</td>
<td>Is the installation/use of CCTV likely to address the identified crime problem? Click: <a href="#">CCTV</a> for more information on this intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intruder alarm systems</td>
<td>Limited evidence of a mixed crime reduction impact (however, this may be due to the available evidence including both unmonitored low quality alarms as well as industry standard monitored alarms)</td>
<td>Domestic burglary</td>
<td>£££</td>
<td>Lead in: short</td>
<td>Intruder alarm system costs are ongoing so it is important to consider maintenance and monitoring</td>
<td>Any alarm installed should be monitored and be of SBD standard quality. Is installation/use of an intruder alarm system likely to address the identified crime problem?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landscaping</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Domestic burglary, anti-social behaviour</td>
<td>£20/hour</td>
<td>Lead in: short</td>
<td>Some ongoing maintenance required</td>
<td>Does landscaping address the crime problem identified?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image Management</td>
<td>Limited evidence on a positive crime reduction impact</td>
<td>Burglary, anti-social behaviour</td>
<td>£ (Low)</td>
<td>Lead in: short</td>
<td>Ongoing maintenance will be required</td>
<td>Support will be required from householders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure car parking facilities</td>
<td>Moderate evidence of a positive crime reduction impact</td>
<td>Vehicle Crime, anti-social behaviour</td>
<td>£££</td>
<td>Lead in: medium</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>How much will the scheme cost? Is planning permission required? Is funding time-limited?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moped, scooter, motorcycle and cycle parking</td>
<td>Limited evidence of a positive crime reduction impact</td>
<td>Vehicle crime, cycle crime</td>
<td>£ - £££</td>
<td>Lead in: medium</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Is the implementation of the identified initiative(s) possible given timescales and budgetary constraints?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other tactics</td>
<td>Limited evidence of a positive</td>
<td>Acquisitive crime, anti-social behaviour</td>
<td>££££</td>
<td>Lead in: med – long</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Do the range of interventions/activities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Landscaping

None
No evidence identified on landscaping alone
Domestic burglary, anti-social behaviour
£20/hour
Lead in: short
Difficulty: low
Some ongoing maintenance required
Does landscaping address the crime problem identified?
Click: Landscaping for more information on this intervention

Image Management

Limited evidence on a positive crime reduction impact
Surveys and interviews only
Burglary, anti-social behaviour
£ (Low)
Involves cosmetic changes to make properties look more attractive
Lead in: short
Difficulty: low
Ongoing maintenance will be required
Support will be required from householders
Click: Image_management for more information on this intervention

Secure car parking facilities

Moderate evidence of a positive crime reduction impact
Single-studies using before/after methods
Vehicle Crime, anti-social behaviour
£££
Involves changes to existing parking amenities or the construction of new facilities
Lead in: medium
Difficulty: medium
None
How much will the scheme cost? Is planning permission required? Is funding time-limited?
Click: Secure parking facilities for more information on this intervention

Moped, scooter, motorcycle and cycle parking

Limited evidence of a positive crime reduction impact
Case studies only
Vehicle crime, cycle crime
£ - £££
Involves changes to existing facilities or the construction of new ones
Lead in: medium
Difficulty: med - high
None
Is the implementation of the identified initiative(s) possible given timescales and budgetary constraints?
Click: Moped_scooter motorcycle and cycle parking for more information on this intervention

Other tactics

Youth shelters

Limited evidence of a positive
Acquisitive crime, anti-social behaviour
££££
Involves construction of
Lead in: med – long
None
Do the range of interventions/activities
Click: Youth_shelters
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighbourhood Watch</th>
<th>Strong evidence of a positive crime reduction impact</th>
<th>Domestic burglary (but some evidence suggests that these schemes can also reduce other 'street' crimes)</th>
<th>£</th>
<th>Lead in: short</th>
<th>Difficulty: low</th>
<th>Will require ongoing monitoring and administration</th>
<th>There is a clear need for multi-agency working and strong community co-ordinators. The police may need to take the lead in implementing Neighbourhood Watch schemes in these areas.</th>
<th>Click: Neighbourhood watch for more information on this intervention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood/Community Wardens</td>
<td>Limited evidence of some positive impact on disorder</td>
<td>Anti-social behaviour</td>
<td>£££££</td>
<td>Lead in: med – long</td>
<td>Difficulty: medium</td>
<td>Will require commitment for ongoing funding including management, support and overheads</td>
<td>Will require consultation, role development, recruitment, training and management</td>
<td>Click: Neighbourhood wardens for more information on this intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repeat victimisation/ cocooning</td>
<td>Strong evidence of positive crime reduction impact</td>
<td>Domestic burglary</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>Lead in: short</td>
<td>Difficulty: low</td>
<td>Will require ongoing resources to conduct crime prevention visits and publicity</td>
<td>Different tactics (or combinations of) may be more effective depending on the problem</td>
<td>Click: Repeat victimisation for more information on this intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property marking</td>
<td>Limited evidence of a positive crime reduction impact</td>
<td>Domestic burglary cycle theft</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>Lead in: short</td>
<td>Difficulty: low</td>
<td>Ongoing marketing required to keep the message fresh</td>
<td>Most effective when over 80% of local residents mark their</td>
<td>Click: Property marking for more information on the evidence and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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6 Weems, J. ibid
| Property Marking | Publicity/Awareness raising | Moderate evidence of a positive crime reduction impact | Domestic burglary, vehicle crime, cycle theft, ££ | Lead in: short Difficulty: low | May need refreshing for continuing impact | Consideration needs to be given to the most appropriate format for the audience Messages need to be clear publicity should link with timescales of other interventions | Click: Publicity For more information on the evidence and how to implement property marking |

## Individual Interventions

### Intervention: Home security measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evidence Quality</th>
<th>Strong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Based on analysis of Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) data and a range of single studies of high-quality.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Description | Home security measures include a range of devices and options often used in combination to ensure that a residential property is more difficult to break into. These include: door and window locks, security chains/limiters, external lights, internal lights, window bars/grilles, intruder alarms and home CCTV. For CSEW analysis purposes, security is grouped into four categories:  
- No security;  
- Less than basic security – one or more device but not including the combination of door double/deadlocks and window locks;  
- Basic security – window locks and door double locks or deadbolts; and  
- Enhanced security – basic plus at least one other device.  
For CSEW recent analysis purposes, the security afforded by each stand-alone security device, and any possible combination of the above devices, is compared to no security. |

| Crime types reduced | Domestic burglary. |

| Effect | It is widely accepted that improvements to home security have been an important factor in the reduction seen in domestic burglary offences since 2003[^8]. |

Analysis of CSEW data has consistently found that households with more security have lower burglary rates. For example, CSEW data 2009/10, found that houses without at least basic security were at nearly 10 times the risk of being burgled than those with it.

Analysis of multiple years of CSEW data found that forced entry burglaries fell more than other MO burglaries owing to more and better security.

Other research found that when legislation in The Netherlands enforced the use of burglar proof doors and windows in all newly built homes (-1999 onwards) the burglary rate in newly-built homes reduced from 1.1 to 0.8% annually – a reduction of 26%.

Research conducted by Armitage & Monchuk (2011) within one police force, demonstrated that building to Secured by Design (SBD) standards reduced the likelihood of burglary victimisation by 55%. Moreover, a recent meta-analysis found that new build homes with SBD features were 54% less likely to experience burglary than comparable non-SBD properties.

The impact of home security improvements on domestic burglary varies depending on the combination of security measures included. A range of research using different methods has looked at the impact of different combinations of measures, for example:

**Analysis of CSEW data**

Tseloni et al (2014 and 2017) have analysed the CSEW data over a number of years and their findings suggest that:

- The greatest benefit from an individual device as a stand-alone security feature is from window locks, external lights or door locks.

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10 Flatley et al (2010) ibid. Prior to 2011 the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) was called the British Crime Survey but is referred to throughout this document as the CSEW


14 Armitage (with UCL) (Sidebottom, Armitage and Thompson, in press)
• A greater number of security devices generally gives more protection than fewer although the benefit of more than four devices is none to moderate, depending on the combination.
• Taking account of the research and specialist advice, the most effective pairs of security devices are window locks with either external lights or door locks.
• The most effective combination of four security devices are: WIDE (window and door locks combined with external and indoor lights) or window and door locks with lights (external or indoor) or CCTV and security chains.

Evidence from CSEW analyses suggests that intruder alarms (the average specification in the UK market) on their own increase burglary risk. However, these analyses do not distinguish between factors such as alarm monitoring, installation quality and geographical factors. Therefore when considering installing an alarm it should comply with industry standard specifications, installed by a company certified by the NSI (National Security Inspectorate) or SSAIB (Security Systems and Alarms Inspection Board. It is also suggested it is accompanied with indoor lights on a timer, enhanced door and window security.

Evaluation of WIDE upgrades
Hunter and Tseloni (2018) found that upgrading security of victims and their cocoon (5x5x5x5) neighbours to WIDE combination (SBD doors and windows and external and internal lights) reduced burglaries by 64% at an average cost of £603 per dwelling.

Evaluations of ‘Secured by Design’ projects
Within England and Wales, ‘Secured by Design’ (SBD) provide details on security standards and design principles that underpin the principles of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). Evaluation of SBD developments have been conducted, both for refurbished and new-build developments; the results of which are described below. However,


other research\textsuperscript{17} highlighted the weaknesses evident in many studies involving SBD in terms of the lack of control areas. This made it difficult to determine whether the reduction in crime was due to the changes in environment, or another factor. However, despite these difficulties, a recent (unpublished) meta-analysis\textsuperscript{18} found that building to SBD standards reduces the likelihood of burglary victimisation by 55%. For examples of impact from SBD projects see below:

For refurbished developments:

- An evaluation of two SBD housing schemes in West Yorkshire compared crime rates on estates before and after refurbishment to SBD standards and found that crime rates had been 67% and 54% higher prior to the refurbishment taking place\textsuperscript{19}.

- Between 2003 and 2008, 39000 Glasgow Housing Authority homes received SBD doors and 11000 homes received SBD windows. Of these, almost 8000 homes received both doors and windows. An evaluation of the impact of these changes found that total housebreaking crime decreased by 26%, attempted housebreaking by 59% and theft by housebreaking decreased by 18\%\textsuperscript{20}.

- A two-year impact study was conducted in Nottingham, comparing the effect of fitting SBD double-glazing and doors to homes on two housing estates. Incidents of burglary fell by 42\% on these estates, compared with a 21\% decrease in burglary throughout the whole of Nottingham. The proportion of burglaries with windows as a means of entry was halved from 30\% to 15\%, and a higher proportion of attempted burglaries where no entry was gained were reported in properties fitted with windows and doors compared to non-SBD properties\textsuperscript{21}.

For new developments:

\textsuperscript{17} Armitage, R. (2018). Domestic Burglary: Burglar Responses to Target Attractiveness. In R. Thompson & N. Tilley Reducing Burglary (pp. 45-76). Cham, Switzerland: Springer

\textsuperscript{18} Armitage (with UCL) (Sidebottom, Armitage and Thompson, in press)


\textsuperscript{20} Teedon, P., Reid, T., Griffiths, P., Lindsay, K., Glen, S., McFadyen, A. & Cruz, P. (2009). Secured by Design Impact Evaluation: Key Findings. Glasgow: Glasgow Caledonian University

Comparisons were made between 25 SBD and 25 non-SBD estates comprising 660 and 522 dwellings. These were matched to ensure that estates with similar characteristics were compared. The study found a 26% reduction in crime events per dwelling in the SBD sample\(^ {22}\).

A re-evaluation of the study\(^ {23}\) found that between August 2007 and July 2008, 19701 burglaries were reported in West Yorkshire, and of these, only two were reported from individuals residing in SBD properties. An investigation into burglary rates within streets containing both SBD and non-SBD properties found that, of a total of 105 offences, 93 were committed against non-SBD properties and 12 against SBD properties. This equated to a rate of 262.7 crimes per 1000 households within the non-SBD sample and 118.8 crimes per 1000 households within the SBD sample\(^ {24}\).

**Offender research**

In addition, interviews with offenders suggest they do take account of security measures when deciding on a target. A study by Armitage (2018) consisted of interviews with 22 prolific burglars who were asked to look at 16 images of residential housing and to describe what would attract them to specific houses when selecting targets for burglary\(^ {25}\). The images were taken in a variety of locations in England and Wales and consisted of a mix of old and new properties, from private and social housing. In the interviews, all offenders made reference to quality of physical security being a primary determinant in deciding whether to burgle a property.

**How it works**

Security devices in general work by making the target less suitable either by increasing the actual or perceived risk, for example, through the use of internal or external security lighting/door and window locks, or by increasing the effort involved.

**Costs & benefits**

In the evaluation of the Nottingham City Homes scheme, Jones et al (2016) conducted a Social Return on Investment (SROI) calculation for one sample area. The SROI analysis aims to take into account the social, economic and environmental outcomes of activities; this was calculated to be £1:£4.76 – every £1 spent generates £4.76 in social value\(^ {26}\).

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23 Armitage (2000) ibid


The Association of British Insurers (2006) estimated that the cost-benefit of implementing target-hardening measures would be on average (in the first year): £630:£1173\(^{27}\). A review of these figures by Davis Langdon (cited in Pease and Gill, 2011)\(^{28}\) suggests that the costs of implementing SBD security measures may be much lower, at £200 for a four-bedroom detached house, £170 for a three or two-bedroomed detached house, £240 for a ground floor apartment and £70 for an upper floor apartment.

Using the above figures for the cost of SBD, and setting these against the cost of crime, Pease and Gill (2011) estimated that any SBD improvements would pay for themselves in just under two years, if burglary and criminal damage offences are taken into account. This period would be reduced if other offences are also considered\(^{29}\).

In terms of costs, estimates range depending on the elements of security that require upgrading:

- Replacing front doors and frames including all security features approx. £800;
- Replacing security on front doors only ranging from £10 -£80 per item;
- Installing outside security light - dawn till dusk approx. £25;
- The cost of internal light timers is approx. £2.00 per item;
- Replacing window and frame with appropriate security approx. £600;
- Replacing security features on windows ranging from £10 - £60 per m2.

For a cost – benefit estimate and an example of implementation in 2013 see Hunter and Tseloni, 2018

For full details of costings see www.securedbydesign.com/safer-streets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practical considerations</th>
<th>Is this intervention appropriate?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The method of the burglary needs to be considered – is it a result of poor home security or is existing security not used or used incorrectly?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- When the burglary occurred in terms of:</td>
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<td>o day of the week;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o week of the year, e.g. burglaries rise in fresher’s week;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o whether the home was occupied or unoccupied.</td>
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</table>


\(^{29}\) Pease K. & Gill, M. ibid
The type of home will be an important determinant of the type of security chosen: Is the housing communal or non-communal residences?

- The nature of the tenure: who owns the homes? Are they privately owned, owned by the local authority, housing association or private landlord?
- How many homes need to be included?
- Nature of victim: Are they elderly or a student? One method of prioritising the houses that will be provided with improved security could be to identify those with the highest risk factors such as those where residents have disabilities and those that have already been victimised [see domestic burglary mapping tool here](#) provided you are logged in to the [Police Knowledge Hub](#). This will allow you to filter down the data displayed on the map by police force, community safety partnership and local authority district.
- Environmental layout: We know end of row properties are more vulnerable than those that are not, or access and movement may also be a feature.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementation lessons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Getting Started</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The following questions should be considered prior to implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Understanding the method of entry will determine the choice of home security measures appropriate for implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Is the housing where the problem is occurring – are homes communal or non-communal?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Have the residents been consulted?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Have the homeowners been consulted? This may include the local authority, private landlord or housing association.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- What is feasible in the timescales available?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- What security features best suit the property and best address the method of entry?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- What suppliers are available to undertake the work?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technical specification</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Any improvement to household security measures should use SBD standards and should comply with fire regulations where necessary, i.e. residential apartment doors. For full details on the appropriate standards and specifications for a wide range of products including all door and window types and styles, locks, visitor door entry systems, access control, glazing, secure mail delivery, lightweight framed walls, roof-lights, security lighting, communal bin and mobility vehicle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
stores plus much more, please see the dedicated area of the Secured By Design website: https://www.securedbydesign.com/safer-streets

**Video Monitoring Systems**

At this stage, there are no video monitoring systems with remote access that have successfully achieved the BSI Internet of Things (IoT) Kitemark following rigorous testing and assessment. This is primarily to protect against the theft of personal data and images.

Until such systems are available, only hard-wired video monitoring systems with on-site recording only should be installed, consisting of one external unit for the primary front door. It is important that the occupiers understand that this type of system will not allow them to view callers or intruders when they are away from their home.

The external unit should be fitted at the appropriate height to view and capture in colour, full frame, facial images of all callers at the door.

The system should enable occupiers to verify genuine callers, both audibly and visually, before opening the door.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>During Implementation</th>
<th>Assessing Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Are additional security features fitted being used appropriately?</td>
<td>• Has the scheme reduced police reported crime?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Are residents happy with the work?</td>
<td>o How does reported crime in this area compare to before the scheme?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Has the work been completed to the appropriate standards?</td>
<td>o How does reported crime in this area compare to other similar areas for the same time period?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Has the scheme reduced self-reported crime?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Has the scheme reduced fear of crime?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Has the scheme led to any additional benefits?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Has the scheme led to any unintended consequences (both negative and positive)?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Has any displacement or diffusion of benefits been seen, for example:</td>
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<td>o a change in other crime within the target area?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>o a change in crime in any of the neighbouring areas?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>o a change in offender modus operandi?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Has the scheme been cost-effective?</td>
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<td>------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>How well was the scheme implemented on the ground – which agencies were involved, who led the project?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What problems emerged and how were these overcome?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Click to return to response summary list  [Response]
### Intervention: Alley-gating

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evidence Quality</th>
<th>Strong Based on systematic review evidence&lt;sup&gt;30&lt;/sup&gt;.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Description</strong></td>
<td>Alley-gates are lockable gates installed to prevent access by offenders to alleyways, such as those which run along the rear of older-style terraced housing in the UK. While normally a burglary prevention tool, alley-gates can also prevent other crimes such as littering and anti-social behaviour by preventing access to alleys by non-residents and better controlling the space. Alley-gates are usually made of iron or steel and are bespoke in relation to the requirements and specifications of an individual alley. The residents of homes adjacent to the gated alley are then left to operate the gates, either using keys or key-code combinations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crime types reduced</strong></td>
<td>Burglary, anti-social behaviour, littering.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Effect** | A systematic review<sup>31</sup> reported the following effects:  
  - A mean reduction of 43% in burglary in areas with alley-gates, based on 9 UK studies which used a comparative research design (including a control group), regardless of whether pre-intervention data was reported.  
  - A statistically significant reduction in burglary in areas with alley-gates, based on 6 UK studies reporting both pre and post-intervention data. |
| **How it works** | Alley-gating works by:  
  - **Increasing the effort**: Prospective offenders are unable to access target properties or use the alleys as a way to escape and evade detection.  
  - **Increasing the risk**: By turning public space into private space, alley-gating may increase natural surveillance from the residents of nearby properties. By turning public space into private space, offenders will not be able to find plausible reasons for being in this area when challenged. |
| **Costs & benefits** | The systematic review<sup>32</sup> reported cost benefit ratios of between £1:£1.24 and £1:£2.79 in the six studies identified for meta-analysis. The lowest cost per alley-gate was £158 and the highest cost was £1,453. **The median cost was £726.** |

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<sup>31</sup> Sidebottom et al (2018) ibid

<sup>32</sup> Sidebottom et al (2018) ibid
Practical considerations

Is this intervention appropriate?

Alley-gating schemes have been shown to be less effective when:

- access to gate keys is not well regulated or the combination of gate key-pads becomes widely known;
- in areas where there is high turnover of residents (such as student areas);
- where residents do not take personal responsibility for informally regulating the gates, and ‘buy-in’ to the process;
- where it is unlikely that residents will consent/agree to the installation of the alley-gates within funding timescales.

Implementation lessons

Getting Started
The following questions should be considered prior to implementation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practical considerations</th>
<th>Nature of the problem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is this intervention appropriate?</td>
<td>What is the rationale for using alley-gates in preference to other crime reduction techniques?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Consultation

- Have local neighbourhood officers and DOCOs been consulted?
- Have residents been consulted about the scheme, and are they supportive?
- Have discussions taken place with other stakeholders, such as:
  - Legal services;
  - Local authorities; and
  - Police community safety/crime reduction teams?

- Does the alley belong to the homeowner or the local authority (adopted or unadopted)?
  - If the alley belongs to the homeowner (unadopted), they need to give written permission for the alley gates to be fitted.
  - If the alley is owned by the local authority (adopted), legal permission is required before alley-gating can take place.

Feasibility

- How much will the scheme cost?
- Is planning permission required?

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Is there funding to continue maintenance of alley-gates?
Is any similar work planned by the local authority or housing association?

**Technical specification**
In consultation with the local authority, it is important to ensure that all neighbouring properties who have legitimate access to the alleyway are consulted prior to the application for alley-gates.

Security gates should be inward opening and positioned as close to the alleyway entrance as possible. Gates should be a minimum of 1.8m, however in some cases the height may need to be increased. Careful consideration should be given to the design of the gates to ensure that there are no climbing points around the hinges and locks and there is no gap underneath of a sufficient size to facilitate unauthorised access.

The gate frame should be secured to a suitable, solid structure, as per the manufacturer’s instructions.

Alley-gates should meet one of the following police preferred security standards:

- LPS 1175 Issue 7.2:2014 Security Rating 1; or
- LPS 1175 Issue 8:2018 Security Rating 1 (A1); or
- STS 202 Issue 7:2016 Burglary Rating 1; or
- LPS 2081 Issue 1.1:2016 Security Rating A.

**During Implementation**
- Are the alley-gates being used as expected?
- Is access being controlled by the gates?
- Are the gates being closed when not in use?

Click to return to response summary list  **Response**
## Intervention: Compartmentation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evidence Quality</th>
<th>Limited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Based on interview data only.</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Developments of over 25 flats, apartments, bedsits or bedrooms can suffer adversely from crime and anti-social behaviour due to unrestricted access to all areas and floors of the building. One method to reduce these problems is to prevent unlawful free movement throughout the building through the use of an access control system. How this is achieved can vary but includes:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Lift and stairwell access controlled separately:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• To prevent the lift and stairwell providing unrestricted access onto a residential landing, each resident should be assigned access to their floor only via the use of a security encrypted electronic key (e.g. fob, card, mobile device, key etc.) both on the stairwell/landing door and lift;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Access to stairwells from the communal lobby should be restricted to residents to reduce the risk of anti-social behaviour or criminal activities;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Unrestricted egress from a landing into the stairwell and from the stairwell to the communal lobby/emergency fire exit should be provided at all times.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Lift and stairwell access jointly controlled via an additional secure doorset:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• An additional secure doorset prevents access to each landing from both the lift and stairwell. Each resident should be assigned access to their floor only via the use of a security encrypted electronic key (e.g. fob, card, mobile device, key etc.) for this doorset;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Access to stairwells from the communal lobby should be restricted to residents to reduce the risk of antisocial behaviour or criminal activities;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Unrestricted egress from a landing into the stairwell and from the stairwell to the communal lobby/emergency fire exit should be provided at all times.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

All compartmentation specifications must be agreed with the Fire Safety Officer.

| Crime types reduced | Burglary and anti-social behaviour. |
| Effect              | Studies investigating the effectiveness of compartmentation on crime are uncommon. Armitage (2011) interviewed 22 prolific burglars, who were asked to look at 16 images of residential housing and to describe what would attract them to specific |
When selecting targets for burglary, in 82% of interviews, offenders mentioned that scope for movement into and out of an area would be a contributory factor in the decision whether to burgle a property. In addition to this, offenders also suggested that areas with movement control presented issues in terms of being able to give a legitimate reason for being in an area if challenged.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How it works</th>
<th>Compartmentation reduces crime by:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Increasing the effort</strong>: By increasing the security of larger developments, the effort required to commit burglary is increased.</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Costs &amp; benefits</th>
<th>No cost/benefit information has been identified</th>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practical considerations</th>
<th>Do the range of interventions/activities proposed address the crime problem?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is this intervention appropriate?</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Implementation lessons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Getting Started</th>
<th>Nature of the problem</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The following questions should be considered prior to implementation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is there a crime problem in the area under consideration?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What crimes are being committed?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How do the offenders access properties – what is their <em>modus operandi</em>?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>How do offenders target these properties?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What is the potential cost of improvements?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Have residents been consulted about potential improvements to properties and are they supportive?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are the proposed changes feasible given time and budgetary constraints?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Details on technical requirements and recommendations for SBD housing developments can be found here.

**Consultation**
- Have relevant stakeholders (including for example residents, the property owners, any management companies involved) been consulted about the changes and are they in agreement?

**Feasibility**
Are the changes to the built environment feasible given time and budgetary constraints?

**Technical specification**
In the event that a lift opens directly into an apartment a security protocol must be agreed between the occupiers and the lift maintenance company to ensure access cannot be gained without the proper authority.

It is imperative that the fire service has unrestricted access to all floors in the event of an emergency, so the internal access control system utilised should incorporate the following features:

1. Where unlawful free internal movement is restricted via the lift then the fire service must be afforded access via a ‘firefighter’s mode’ or an evacuation lift in ‘evacuation mode’.

2. If unlawful free internal movement has been restricted via an access control system acting on dedicated external doorsets and any additional doorsets providing access to individual floors/landings, then an electronic release must be incorporated within the system to allow the fire service free access to all of the communal areas of the building. The electronic release system must be weatherproof, easily identifiable and located close to the entrance. It has been agreed between the police and fire and rescue services that a switch should be installed within an Access Control Box (ACB). The key system for the ACB should be of a restricted type, acceptable to the local fire and rescue service.

An ACB should be tested and certificated to one of the following standards:

- LPS 1175 Issue 7.2:2014 Security Rating 2; or
The exact location of an ACB should be specified following consultation with the local Fire and Rescue Service.

Both the ACB and Premises Information Box (PIB) should be clearly marked with a photo luminescent identification sign.

Break glass emergency door exit release devices are sometimes abused, which means some buildings are left insecure for long periods of time. These should be replaced with vandal resistant stainless steel self-resetting emergency exit systems.

The installation and system type must be in full compliance with the Building Regulations and achieve final ‘sign-off’ by local Building Control or Approved Inspector.

If the break glass emergency door release device provides access to residential areas as part of the emergency egress route, additional security must be provided to restrict access to the fire egress route only to maintain the security of the building line. This is also a requirement of Part Q of the Building Regulations (England and Wales).

All compartmentation specifications must be agreed with the Fire Safety Officer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>During Implementation</th>
<th>Assessing Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Are the proposed changes being made as expected?</td>
<td>• Has the scheme reduced police reported crime?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Are residents still supportive of the changes?</td>
<td>o How does reported crime in this area compare to before the scheme?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o How does reported crime in this area compare to other similar areas for the same time period?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Has the scheme reduced self-reported crime?</td>
</tr>
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<td>o a change in crime in any of the neighbouring areas?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Question</td>
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<td>--------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>a change in offender <em>modus operandi</em>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has the scheme been cost-effective?</td>
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<td>How well was the scheme implemented on the ground – which agencies were involved, who led the project?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What problems emerged and how were these overcome?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Click to return to response summary list  **Response**
**Intervention: Enhancing Defensible Space & Demarcation**

| Evidence Quality | Limited  
|------------------|---------  
|                  | Based on interview data only.  

**Description**
Defensible space has the simple aim of designing the physical environment in a way which enables the resident to control the areas around their home. This is achieved by organising all space in such a way that residents may exercise a degree of control over the activities that take place there. Boundaries should clearly define the difference between public and private space.

**Crime types reduced**
Burglary.

**Effect**
Studies investigating the effectiveness of defensible space on crime are uncommon. Armitage (2011) interviewed 22 prolific burglars, who were asked to look at 16 images of residential housing and to describe what would attract them to specific houses when selecting targets for burglary. In 36% of these interviews, offenders mentioned that areas with clearly defined defensible space may deter them from committing burglary. This is because offenders felt that the likelihood of being seen to commit an offence in these areas would be increased.  

**How it works**
Defensible space and demarcation reduces crime by:
- **Increasing the risks**: Demarcation and the creation of defensible spaces increases the risk of an individual being observed and identified whilst committing a criminal act.
- **Increasing the effort**: By improving boundary security, the effort required to commit burglary is increased.

**Costs & benefits**
No cost/benefit information has been identified

**Practical considerations**
Is this intervention appropriate?
Do the range of interventions/activities proposed address the crime problem?

---

## Implementation lessons

### Getting Started

The following questions should be considered prior to implementation:

- Is there a crime problem in the area under consideration?
- What crimes are being committed?
- How do the offenders access properties – what is their *modus operandi*?
- How do offenders target these properties?
- What is the potential cost of improvements?
- Have residents been consulted about potential improvements to properties and are they supportive?
- Are the proposed changes feasible given time and budgetary constraints?

Details on technical requirements and recommendations for SBD housing developments can be found [here](#).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of the problem</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Is there a crime problem in the area under consideration?</td>
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</table>

### Consultation

- Involving residents and users – including young people – in the management and design of their area provides a real sense of ownership. This can be achieved in a number of ways, such as town centre management partnerships, tenant management organisations, community development trusts, regeneration programmes and management trusts.

### Feasibility

- Are the changes to the built environment feasible given time and budgetary constraints?

### Technical specification

- Low front boundaries are better than high boundaries as they allow good vision into the area at the front of the property and remove potential places for intruders to hide.
- Shrubs, plants and bushes at the front should not exceed 1m in height. Trees should have high canopies no lower than 2m. This combination will provide a clear view through to the front of the property.
- Front boundary walls and fences should not exceed 1m in height, unless they are metal railings that allow good natural surveillance of the front of the property.
- Side and rear boundaries should be a minimum of 1.8m overall and be capable of maintaining this height over different terrain. If a public footpath or other route provides legitimate access to the side or rear of the building, it may be necessary to increase the height of the boundary from 1.8m to 2.1m or more, depending on the terrain. The additional height will have to be justified and may require planning permission, so early consultation with the local planning authority is essential.
- A light wooden trellis topping, particularly the diamond pattern, is flimsy and difficult to climb. It increases the height of the boundary and provides a framework for thorny plants and shrubs to create a natural, defensive barrier. If trellis is attached to a brick wall, ensure that it is fitted to the outside edge of the brickwork to reduce potential footholds.
- Side and rear gates, including their frames, should be in good repair, free from rot and the same height as the adjoining fence (1.8m minimum). They should be located on or as near to the front building line as possible and be capable of being locked by key from both sides with a British Standard 3621 mortice deadlock.
- Where building elevations adjoin public footpaths, allowing easy access to openings within buildings or graffiti, a 1m buffer zone can be created using either a 1.2 – 1.4m railing (with an access gate) or a 1m mature height hedge with high thorn content. Hedging will have to be protected with a fence until it becomes established. The hedge shall be contained within the boundary of the adjacent building to increase the likelihood that it will be maintained.
- Where there is insufficient room to create defensible space between public and private space, an appropriate (non-destructive) climbing plant should be planted adjacent to the wall, or a finish applied to the wall that will allow easy removal of graffiti.
- Demarcation of territory without physical barriers may be appropriate to some settings, provided that the intention is not to impede access physically.
- Design techniques that most people respond to include changes in paving, surface texture/colour, landscaping, planting and signage.
- Landscaping can be used to make places safer as well as more attractive, provided it does not restrict natural surveillance. Thorny or prickly plants can help to protect property.

**During Implementation**

- Are the proposed changes being made as expected?
- Are residents still supportive of the changes?
| Assessing Impact | Has the scheme reduced police reported crime?  
|                 |   o How does reported crime in this area compare to before the scheme?  
|                 |   o How does reported crime in this area compare to other similar areas for the same time period?  
|                 | Has the scheme reduced self-reported crime?  
|                 | Has the scheme reduced fear of crime?  
|                 | Has the scheme led to any additional benefits?  
|                 | Has the scheme led to any unintended consequences (both negative and positive)?  
|                 | Has any displacement or diffusion of benefits been seen for example:  
|                 |   o a change in other crime within the target area?  
|                 |   o a change in crime in any of the neighbouring areas?  
|                 |   o a change in offender *modus operandi*?  
|                 | Has the scheme been cost-effective?  
|                 | How well was the scheme implemented on the ground – which agencies were involved, who led the project?  
|                 | What problems emerged and how were these overcome?  

**Click to return to response summary list**  
Response
# Intervention: Roads, footpaths and subways

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evidence Quality</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Based on a number of single studies using before/after methodology.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Description
Closing roads and footpaths can prevent crime because there is a relationship between street access and crime rates. This is because:

- Offenders find targets in familiar territory;
- Offenders are more likely to avoid cul-de-sacs where the probability of being observed is higher;
- Access to properties is restricted;
- Reducing entrance and exit routes can make escaping without being seen more difficult.

## Crime types reduced
Burglary, robbery, drugs offences, violent crime.

## Effect
Clarke (2005)\(^{37}\) identified 10 studies investigating the effect of road closures on crime, either as a stand-alone intervention, or as part of a range of different crime reduction techniques. All studies showed a reduction in crime, with little or no displacement being recorded for burglary. In addition to this, research conducted by Johnson & Bowers (2010) found that risk of burglary was associated with increased permeability – burglary risk was lower in cul-de-sacs, and higher on major roads\(^{38}\).

## How it works
Changes to roads, footpaths and subways reduce crime by:

- **Increasing the risks**: Enhanced natural surveillance within areas subject to road and footpath closures.

## Costs & benefits
No cost/benefit information has been identified

## Practical considerations
- Do the range of interventions/activities proposed address the crime problem?

---


37 ibid

### Implementation lessons

#### Getting Started

**The following questions should be considered prior to implementation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of the problem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Is there a crime problem in the area under consideration?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- What crimes are being committed?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- How do the offenders access properties – what is their <em>modus operandi</em>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- How do offenders target these properties?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- What is the potential cost of improvements?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Have residents been consulted about potential improvements to properties and are they supportive?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Are the proposed changes feasible given time and budgetary constraints?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consultation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Have relevant stakeholders (including, for example, residents, the property owners, any management companies or local authorities) been consulted about the changes and are they in agreement?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feasibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Are the changes to the built environment feasible given time and budgetary constraints?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technical specification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Road closure:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- There may be situations where permanent road closures are necessary. If this solution forms part of your response, further advice, in the first instance, should be sought from your local Highways Authority.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traffic calming:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Vehicular and pedestrian routes should be designed to ensure that they are visually open, direct, well used and should not undermine the defensible space of neighbourhoods.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- Design features can help to identify the acceptable routes through a development, thereby encouraging their use, and in doing so enhance the feeling of safety.
- Where it is desirable to limit access/use to residents and their legitimate visitors, features such as rumble strips, change of road surface (by colour or texture), pillars, brick piers or narrowing of the carriageway may be used. This helps to define the defensible space, psychologically giving the impression that the area beyond is private.
- Traffic calming measures help to reduce the speed and volume of traffic passing through an area. This can help to reduce anti-social behaviour caused by cars, motor cycles, scooters or mopeds, improving the quality of the local environment for people living in the area.
- This can be achieved using the following measures:
  - Road humps;
  - Mini roundabouts;
  - Footway build-outs;
  - Chicanes;
  - Priority junctions;
  - Central islands;
  - Reduced speed limits.

- If this solution forms part of your response, further advice, in the first instance, should be sought from your local Highways Authority.

**Footpath closure:**

- There are advantages in some road layout patterns over others especially where the pattern frustrates the searching behaviour of the criminal and their need to escape.
- Whilst it is accepted that through routes often form part of the development layout, the security of the development must not be compromised by excessive permeability, for instance by allowing the criminal legitimate access to the rear or side boundaries of dwellings, or by providing too many or unnecessary segregated footpaths.
- If this solution forms part of your response, further advice, in the first instance, should be sought from your local Highways Authority.

**Subways:**

- If the subway is already in existence and it is necessary to retain it, it should be well-lit with vandal resistant lighting, be as wide and as short as possible, with a clear line of sight to the exit. Chamfering the access points can help
reduce areas of concealment. Radius (convex) entrance/exit walls can reduce the length of the subway and the opportunity for inappropriate loitering.

- If the subway is under-used and offers little value to local residents but provides a gathering point for anti-social and intimidating behaviour, consideration should be given to closing it.
- Where graffiti is an issue, an anti-graffiti finish can be applied to the surfaces to prevent paint from bonding to them and to allow easy removal.

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<td>Are the proposed changes being made as expected?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Are residents still supportive of the changes?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is worth being aware that there can be conflicts and contradictions with local and national planning policy pushing connectivity in terms of walkability and sustainability.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Has the scheme reduced fear of crime?</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Has any displacement or diffusion of benefits been seen for example:</td>
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<td>o a change in crime in any of the neighbouring areas?</td>
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<tr>
<td>o a change in offender <em>modus operandi</em>?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Has the scheme been cost-effective?</td>
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<tr>
<td>How well was the scheme implemented on the ground – which agencies were involved, who led the project?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What problems emerged and how were these overcome?</td>
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### Intervention: Street lighting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evidence Quality</th>
<th>Strong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Based on systematic review evidence(^{39}).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Description | Improved street lighting is a form of situational crime prevention that involves increasing the levels of illumination on the street or in other public spaces. |

| Crime types reduced | Burglary, robbery, violent crime. |

| Effect | The effect of street lighting was calculated from 13 studies; 8 from the USA and 5 from the UK. Examination of these studies showed a 21% decrease in crime in areas with improved street lighting compared to control areas\(^{40}\). Detailed examination of the UK studies showed a statistically significant decrease in crime for four of the five studies, suggesting that improved street lighting reduces crime. The combined decrease in crime from the five UK studies was 38%. The improvement of street lighting has also been shown to decrease crime during the day. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How it works</th>
<th>Improved street lighting reduces crime by:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Increasing the risks:</strong> Improved street lighting increases the likelihood that an offender will be identified. It is also thought that improved street lighting in an area increases community pride and informal social control, which can increase the number of people who use an area, therefore the number of potential witnesses to criminal behaviour.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Costs & benefits | Cost-benefit analysis of two UK street lighting schemes showed that financial savings from reduced crimes greatly exceeded the financial costs of improved street lighting, due to a reduction in property being stolen, fewer properties needing repair, fewer insurance costs, and a reduction in the wider impacts on some victims, such as time off work to deal with the incident\(^{41}\). |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practical considerations</th>
<th>Is street lighting missing or insufficient for the area under consideration?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is there sufficient time within the funding period to implement changes?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{40}\) Welsh & Farrington, ibid

# Implementation lessons

## Getting Started

The following questions should be considered prior to implementation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of the problem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Have you clearly defined the neighbourhood boundaries?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Have you collected reliable data about the types of crime and disorder that are the focus of concern?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Do you know the proportion of crimes committed by day and by night?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Do you know whether these crimes are committed by local residents or outsiders?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• If outsiders, do you know whether they go to the neighbourhood specifically to commit crimes, or whether they do so when visiting or passing through?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Can you document that the lighting in the neighbourhood is seriously deficient?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Have you estimated how much crime improved lighting will prevent?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Do you have clear expectations about how improved lighting can reduce crime? For example, by enabling witnesses to see offenders and report incidents to the police? Or by raising the fear in the minds of offenders that this will happen?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Have you explored alternatives to improved lighting, e.g., video surveillance, neighbourhood watch, crackdowns, crime prevention advice?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Can you explain why these alternatives cannot adequately substitute for improved lighting?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Formulating a Plan

- How many new lights are needed?
- How many existing lights must be upgraded?
- What type of lights will be installed?
- Where will the lights be located?

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If video cameras are in use in the neighbourhood, will the improved lighting affect the quality of their operation?
Might improved lighting in some places encourage undesirable behaviour? For example, might lighting a rarely used footpath increase opportunities for victimisation?
Will the lighting selected produce adequate levels of vertical illumination so that people can clearly see the faces of others?
How much will the new lighting cost?
Have you obtained the agreement of any residents who will be required to pay for the improvements?
How long will it take to install the new lighting once agreement has been reached?
Who will install the new lighting?
Is there a detailed plan showing which trees and bushes need to be trimmed?
Who is responsible for trimming the shrubbery?

**Implementing the Plan**

- Has a project manager been appointed?
- Have you constructed a detailed timeline showing when each element of the improved lighting program will be started and completed?
- Does this plan include both approvals and actions?
- Are all parties informed about and in agreement with this timetable?

**Consultation**

- Do you have support from the police district commanders, stakeholders, such as the local authority?
- Do you have support from local residents?
- Are residents content with the appearance and location of the new lights?
- Have you dealt adequately with individual concerns about light trespass?
- Can you answer any worries about light pollution?
- Have you allayed resident concerns about neighbourhood stigmatisation?
- Have you dealt with the worries of nearby communities about displaced crime?
- Have you briefed the local media about the need for improved lighting?
- Have you dealt satisfactorily with public opposition?

**Feasibility**

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43 Clarke, R. ibid
- Is the purchase and installation of lighting possible given timescales and budgetary constraints?

**Technical specification**

- Design specifications for lighting can be found [here](#).

- All street lighting for adopted highways and footpaths, private estate roads and footpaths and parking facilities must comply with BS 5489-1:2013. Where conflict with other statutory provisions occurs, such as developments within conservation areas, requirements should be discussed with the DOCO and the local authority lighting designers.

- It is recognised that some local authorities have ‘dark sky’ policies and deliberately light some of their rural, low crime areas to very low levels of illumination. Some are currently experimenting with switching off street lamps in low crime areas between certain hours of the night in order to save energy costs and reduce CO2 emissions.

- Secured by Design supports the Institution of Lighting Professionals (ILP) in discouraging ‘switch off’ unless a full risk assessment has been carried out, and the ILP also recommends that ‘switch off’ never be implemented purely for cost saving. A variable controlled lighting level is always the preferred option in addition to one which does not disadvantage disabled and older people who may have a sensory impairment and require well-lit routes to enable easy wayfinding and to make other users more easily visible. Attention to position and location of lighting to improve illuminance at ground level can avoid user casting shadows onto the surface whilst minimising light pollution.

- Bollard lighting is purely for wayfinding and can be easily obscured. It does not project sufficient light at the right height making it difficult to recognise facial features and as a result causes an increase in the fear of crime. It should be avoided.

- Trees may restrict the performance of street lighting by blocking light or causing damage through collision with branches and should not be located within 5 metres of a lighting source. Account must be taken of the effects of seasonal variations on planting when designing such schemes.
- A declaration of conformity to BS 5489-1:2013 by a competent independent designer. Competency shall be demonstrated by achievement to at least ILP competency level 3 or 4, i.e. the designer will be a Member of the ILP (MILP) and either IEng or CEng qualified to be deemed competent to be able to design under CDM regulations. Additionally, a risk and environmental assessment (EMS) for the CDM designer compliance requirements must be included. Manufacturer designed schemes without risk or environmental assessments should not be accepted as they do not cover the CDM designer risk elements that are required.

- Secured by Design encourages, wherever possible, the use of the most environmentally friendly light sources. Moreover, the Institute of Lighting Professionals (ILP) currently favours the use of good quality LED lighting and other energy effective light sources and advises against the use of fluorescent lighting which is environmentally unsustainable for a variety of reasons.

### During Implementation

- Is the planning and installation processes proceeding as planned?
- Are there any issues arising that may prevent the program of work being completed?

### Assessing Impact

- Has the scheme reduced police reported crime and disorder?
  - How does reported crime and disorder in this area compare to before the scheme?
  - How does it compare to other similar areas for the same time period?
  - Will the before and after time periods be directly comparable? For example, will you be able to control for time of year?
  - Will you be able to compare the proportions of crime committed by day and by night?

- Has the scheme led to any displacement or diffusion of benefits such as:
  - a change in other crime within the target area; or
  - a change in crime in any of the neighbouring areas or change in offender modus operandi?

- Has the scheme reduced fear of crime?
- Has the scheme led to any unintended consequences (both negative and positive)?
- How well was the scheme implemented on the ground – which agencies were involved, who led the project?
  - What problems emerged and how were these overcome?
- Will you try to estimate the cost-effectiveness of the improved street lighting\(^44\)?

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\(^{44}\) Clarke, R. ibid
Click to return to response summary list. Response
### Intervention: CCTV

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evidence Quality</th>
<th>Strong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Based on systematic review evidence.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Description | Closed Circuit Television surveillance cameras are used as a situational crime prevention measure in public and private places. It is a formal surveillance technique where cameras are set up and monitored to aid crime prevention, detect offenders and control crowds. |

| Crime types reduced | Vehicle crime. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>A meta-analysis of 14 CCTV projects in 2007 reported that:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- CCTV was most effective in reducing vehicle crimes in locations such as train station parking facilities, especially with high coverage and with the involvement of other interventions such as lighting;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- CCTV was found to not be effective in city centres or residential areas.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A further systematic review was conducted in 2009 based on 41 studies found that: |
| - CCTV caused a 16% decrease in crime in the areas studied, in comparison to control areas; |
| - The most effective CCTV schemes were in parking facilities which experienced a 51% decrease in crime. The schemes in other public places such as city and town centres and around public housing, were small and non-significant, showing a 7% decrease. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How it works</th>
<th>CCTV reduces crime by:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- <strong>Increasing the risk:</strong> Increasing an offender’s perception/likelihood of being caught. Also encouraging the public to use an area to enhance public surveillance, encouraging potential victims to take precautions, and creating signalling improvements to public areas increasing community pride, and aiding the effective deployment of security staff to incidents in the most efficient way.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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46 Farrington et al, ibid

47 Welsh & Farrington, ibid
Costs & benefits

Re-deployable CCTV cameras are a more cost-efficient method of CCTV as they are mobile and can be moved more easily between different locations. In addition, as technology can be expensive, a more cost-effective method to complementary crime control technologies could be bringing additional camera operators or patrol officers into CCTV schemes (Piza et al., 2019).

Practical considerations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is this intervention appropriate?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Do the range of interventions/activities proposed address the crime problem?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Is funding available for ongoing costs post-installation?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Implementation lessons

Getting Started

The following questions should be considered prior to implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of the problem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• What are the areas of concern? (mark on a site plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What are the problems / threats / security issues on the site?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Who are the stakeholders and what do they require on the site?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What is the risk level of the criminal activity? (low / moderate / severe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What are the consequences if the activity was not monitored or recorded? (E.g. financial loss or the safety of the public).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Can you prioritise the criminal activity?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Are there other or more effective methods to tackle this activity?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Is the criminal activity a short or long-term issue?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What is a successful outcome of CCTV? (Prevention of theft or damage / identifying an intruder)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What laws are implicated in storing and accessing information?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How much maintenance and upkeep is required?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Consultation**
- Have relevant stakeholders (including for example residents, the property owners, any management companies involved) been consulted about the changes and are they in agreement?

**Feasibility**
- Are the changes to the built environment feasible given time and budgetary constraints?
- Are ongoing costs related to monitoring and upkeep of CCTV budgeted for?

**Technical specification**

CCTV is not a universal solution to security problems, it forms part of an overall security plan. It can help deter crime and criminal behaviour, assist with the identification of offenders, promote personal safety and provide reassurance for residents and visitors.

Images of people are covered by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and so is information about people which is derived from images – for example, vehicle registration numbers. Most uses of CCTV will be covered by the Act, regardless of the number of cameras or how sophisticated the equipment is.

Specifiers are reminded that there will be a requirement for a data controller to ensure compliance with the GDPR. The data controller must ensure that all CCTV images that can be used to identify individuals are used, stored and disclosed in line with the GDPR principles.

It is important that signs are displayed explaining that CCTV is in operation.

A CCTV system should:
- be installed by an NSI (National Security Inspectorate) or SSAIB (Security Systems and Alarms Inspection Board) approved company;
- have CCTV cameras contained in vandal resistant housings with the facility for ceiling or wall mounting;
- record images in colour HD quality;
- not be affected by concentrated white light sources directed at the camera, such as car headlights and street lighting;
- ensure that ‘on-site’ recording equipment or other hard drive unit is contained in a lockable steel cabinet to LPS 1175 Security Rating 1 (A1) or STS 202 Burglary Rating 1;
- identify each camera’s location and record this information along with time and date stamping;
- provide suitable methods of export and incorporate the required software to view the exported footage.

CCTV cameras associated with visitor door entry systems covering communal entrances and internal lobby areas should be installed and be capable of providing images of persons that are clearly identifiable on smaller devices such as smart phones.

Ideally, CCTV systems should be monitored live 24/7 giving the ability to react to a situation as it occurs, as unmonitored systems only provide retrospective images. However, this is not a requirement of Secured by Design for residential developments. Most CCTV systems are designed for recording images and for the post event investigation only, in which case nobody is required to monitor the activities live. Police recommend that images are stored for a minimum of 31 days.

Early discussions with an independent CCTV expert and potential installers can resolve a number of matters, including:

- monitoring and recording requirements;
- activation in association with the intruder alarm;
- requirements for observation, facial recognition/identification and automatic number plate recognition (ANPR);
- areas to be monitored and field of view;
- activities to be monitored;
- the use of recorded images;
- maintenance of equipment and the management of recording;
- subsequent on-going training of operatives.

Further advice may be obtained from the Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s website. This includes Surveillance Camera Code of Practice which sets out 12 guiding principles which strike a balance between protecting the public and upholding civil liberties. The principles provide a coherent and comprehensive structure to enable good and transparent decision-making that will reassure the public that surveillance cameras are used to protect and support communities rather than spy on them.
The Commissioner’s website contains a collection of resources to help people comply with the surveillance camera code of practice and follow good practice and legal requirements: [https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/surveillance-camera-guidance-tools-and-templates](https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/surveillance-camera-guidance-tools-and-templates). This includes the Passport to compliance, which is aimed at large public-space surveillance camera systems such as town centre schemes operated by local authorities.

Every police force in England and Wales has appointed a Senior Responsible Officer with strategic responsibility for the integrity and efficacy of the processes in place within the police force which ensure compliance with Section 33 of the PoFA in support of the Chief Officer, and in respect of all relevant surveillance camera systems operated by the force. SROs are a source of advice and support for police officers.

The recommended standards for the surveillance camera industry can be found at: [https://www.gov.uk/guidance/recommended-standards-for-the-cctv-industry](https://www.gov.uk/guidance/recommended-standards-for-the-cctv-industry).

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<td></td>
<td>o Will the time periods being compared be comparable?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o How does reported crime and disorder in this area compare to other similar areas for the same time period?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Has the scheme reduced self-reported crime?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Has the scheme reduced fear of crime?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Has the scheme led to any unintended consequences (both negative and positive)?</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>• Has any displacement or diffusion of benefits been seen for example:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o a change in other crime within the target area?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o a change in crime in any of the neighbouring areas?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o a change in offender modus operandi?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Has the scheme been cost-effective?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• How well was the scheme implemented on the ground — which agencies were involved, who led the project?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o What problems emerged and how were these overcome?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Click to return to response summary list  Response
## Intervention: Intruder alarm systems

### Evidence Quality

**Limited**
There is no high-quality evaluations of the crime reduction impact of different forms of intruder alarms. However, there is some evidence from other research which provides a mixed effect of alarms on crime reduction:

There is some evidence from analysis of multiple years of Crime Survey for England and Wales data\(^{51}\) that alarms on their own may increase the risk of victimisation.

Some evidence from interviews with offenders (Armitage, 2018) suggest that offenders avoid houses where high-quality monitored alarms are in evidence\(^{52}\).

### Description

Domestic intruder alarms come in different forms\(^{53}\):
- **Bells-only alarms** make a noise, but don't contact anyone (such as the police or you).
- **Dialler burglar alarms** automatically dial your phone number, or that of nominated friends and family, when the alarm is triggered.
- **Smart home-security systems** contact you or family members when the alarm goes off through a smartphone or tablet app.
- **A monitoring contract** means you pay a company monthly or annually to take action or call the police if the alarm goes off.

### Crime types reduced

Domestic burglary.

### Effect

Evidence from CSEW analyses suggests that intruder alarms (the average specification in the UK market) on their own increase burglary risk\(^{54}\). However, these analyses do not distinguish between factors such as alarm monitoring, installation

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\(^{54}\) Tseloni et al (2014 and 2017) ibid
quality and geographical factors. Therefore when considering installing an alarm it should comply with industry standard specifications, installed by a company certified by the NSI (National Security Inspectorate) or SSAIB (Security Systems and Alarms Inspection Board. It is also suggested it is accompanied with indoor lights on a timer, enhanced door and window security.

Other research with offenders\textsuperscript{55} suggests that although offenders were not deterred by burglar alarms in general, some did refer to a brand of monitored alarm as being a deterrent. Offenders interviewed discussed methods for disabling alarms. These included spraying expanding polyurethane foam into the external alarm box the night before the burglary and taking the internal box off the wall once inside the property which they stated would, for the majority of brands, deactivate the alarm.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How it works</th>
<th>Intruder alarm systems reduce crime by:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increasing the risk: Increasing an offender’s perception/likelihood of being caught. However, this may not be the case in relation to cheap unmonitored alarms.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Costs & benefits | No costs or benefits have been identified from the literature. |

| Practical considerations | Do the range of interventions/activities proposed address the crime problem? |

| Implementation lessons |

### Getting Started

The following questions should be considered prior to implementation:

#### Consultation
- Have relevant stakeholders (including for example residents, the property owners, any management companies involved) been consulted about the changes and are they in agreement?

#### Feasibility
- Are the changes to the built environment feasible given time and budgetary constraints?
- Are ongoing costs related to monitoring and upkeep of the intruder alarm system budgeted for?

#### Technical specification

Intruder alarm systems shall meet the requirements of BS EN 50131 (wired and wire free systems). All installations shall be in accordance with the current electrical regulations. If an immediate police response is required then installers must meet the requirements of the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) policy document – Guidelines on Police Requirements & Response to Security Systems can be obtained from [www.securedbydesign.com](http://www.securedbydesign.com).

The intruder alarm installer should be approved by either the NSI (National Security Inspectorate) or the SSAIB (Security Systems and Alarms Inspection Board).

### During Implementation

- Are the proposed changes being made as expected?
- Are residents still supportive of the changes?

### Assessing Impact

- Has the scheme reduced police reported crime?
- Has the scheme reduced self-reported crime?
- Has the scheme reduced fear of crime?
- Has the scheme led to any additional benefits?
- Has the scheme led to any unintended consequences (both negative and positive)?
- Has a reduction in crime led to an increase in other crime within the target area?
- Has the reduction of crime within the target block led to an increase in crime in the neighbouring area?
- Has the scheme resulted in a change in offender *modus operandi*?
- Has the scheme been cost-effective?
| | How was the scheme implemented on the ground – which agencies were involved, who led the project? |
| | What problems emerged and how were these overcome? |

Click to return to response summary list  Response
### Intervention: Landscaping

| Evidence Quality | N/A  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No literature available/identified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Description</strong></td>
<td>As a general rule, building frontages should be open to view. Attention should be given to the location of walls and hedges so that they do not create climbing aids or obscure doors and windows, lights or CCTV cameras. Certain species of plants such as spiny or thorny shrubs can help prevent graffiti, loitering and climbing by creating or enhancing perimeter security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crime types reduced</strong></td>
<td>Burglary and antisocial behaviour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effect</strong></td>
<td>No literature has been identified that provides details of the effect of landscaping on crime.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **How it works** | Landscaping reduces crime by:  
  - **Increasing the effort:** By removing climbing aids, landscaping increases the effort required to commit burglary.  
  - **Increasing the risk:** By ensuring that doors, windows, lights or CCTV cameras are not obscured, there is a greater risk that burglars will be visible. |
| **Costs & benefits** | Landscaping costs approximately £20/hr. No benefits have been costed in the available literature. |
| **Practical considerations** |  
  - Do the range of interventions/activities proposed address the crime problem? |

### Implementation lessons

#### Getting Started
The following questions should be answered prior to implementation:  
- Is there a crime problem in the area under consideration?  
- What crimes are being committed?  
- How do the offenders access properties – what is their *modus operandi*?
### Considered Prior to Implementation

- How do offenders target these properties?
- What is the potential cost of improvements?
- Have residents been consulted about potential improvements to properties and are they supportive?
- Are the proposed changes feasible given time and budgetary constraints?
- Details on technical requirements and recommendations for SBD housing developments can be found [here](#).

### Consultation

- Have relevant stakeholders been consulted about the changes and are they in agreement?

### Feasibility

- Are the changes to the built environment feasible given time and budgetary constraints?

### Technical Specification

- Defensive planting is not just about prickly shrubs, it is about selecting the right type of plant for the right aspect and environment, for example, open branched and columnar fastigiated trees can be used in a landscape scheme where natural and formal surveillance is required, whereas climbing plants can be used to cover walls to deter climbing and graffiti.
- Where good visibility is needed, shrubs, plants and bushes should not exceed 1m in height. Trees should have high canopies no lower than 2m. This combination will provide a clear field of vision.

### During Implementation

- Are the proposed changes being made as expected?
- Are residents still supportive of the changes?

### Assessing Impact

- Has the scheme reduced police reported crime?
- Has the scheme reduced self-reported crime?
- Has the scheme reduced fear of crime?
- Has the scheme led to any additional benefits?
- Has the scheme led to any unintended consequences (both negative and positive)?
- Has a reduction in crime led to an increase in other crime within the target area?
- Has the reduction of crime within the target block led to an increase in crime in the neighbouring area?
- Has the scheme resulted in a change in offender *modus operandi*?
- Has the scheme been cost-effective?
• How was the scheme implemented on the ground – which agencies were involved, who led the project?
• What problems emerged and how were these overcome?
## Intervention: Image Management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evidence Quality</th>
<th>Limited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Based on survey &amp; interview data only.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Description | Image management is one of the principal components of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED), and seeks to promote a positive image of an area. This can deter burglary by giving potential offenders the impression that these well-maintained areas are likely to be subject to surveillance. Poorly maintained areas can attract crime and deter use by legitimate users, reducing natural surveillance\(^5^6\). |

| Crime types reduced | Burglary and anti-social behaviour. |

| Effect | Studies investigating the effectiveness of image management on crime are uncommon. Armitage (2011) interviewed 22 prolific burglars, who were asked to look at 16 images of residential housing and to describe what would attract them to specific houses when selecting targets for burglary. In 77% of these interviews, offenders mentioned that the management or maintenance of an area would be a contributory factor in the decision whether to burgle a property\(^5^7\). |

- Areas with low levels of maintenance were seen to be attractive as it is likely that less care is being given to security, and large quantities of rubbish equates to larger quantities of goods to steal.  
- However, poorly maintained areas may be unattractive to burglars as residents that do not maintain their property may not have much to steal.  
- Well-maintained properties may be attractive to burglars as the householder may be more affluent, but affluent areas may have enhanced surveillance\(^5^8\).  

Cozens and Tarca (2016)\(^5^9\) conducted similar research, whereby two photographs of properties were taken, one of a well-maintained property and one of poorly-maintained property. These photographs were subjected to a CPTED ‘audit’ which indicated that the well-maintained property contained many of the features thought to deter crime, with the poorly-maintained house scoring poorly. These photos were shown to 168 members of the public and 12 built-environment professionals who

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\(^5^8\) ibid  
were asked how likely it was that a range of illegal behaviours occurred at each property. These included squatting, vandalism, graffiti, burglary, drug-dealing and kidnapping. Overall, the poorly-maintained house was perceived to be associated with higher probability of crime across all categories. For burglary, members of the public felt that burglary was likely, although built-environment professionals felt it was less/not likely. It was suggested that this may be due to the house appearing unoccupied.

**How it works**
Image management reduces crime by:
- **Increasing the risk**: Potential offenders perceive poorly-maintained areas as easier to burgle, as security measures are thought to be less comprehensive.

**Costs & benefits**
No cost/benefit information has been identified.

**Practical considerations**
Is this intervention appropriate?
- Do the range of interventions/activities proposed address the crime problem?

### Implementation lessons

**Getting Started**
The following questions should be answered prior to implementation:
- Is there a crime problem in the area under consideration?
- What crimes are being committed?
- How do the offenders access properties – what is their *modus operandi*?
- How do offenders target these properties?
- What is the potential cost of improvements?
- Have residents been consulted about potential improvements to properties and are they supportive?
- Are the proposed changes feasible given time and budgetary constraints?

Details on technical requirements and recommendations for SBD housing developments can be found [here](#).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Consultation</strong></th>
<th>Have relevant stakeholders (including for example residents, the property owners, any management companies involved) been consulted about the changes and are they in agreement?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Feasibility</strong></td>
<td>Are the changes to the built environment feasible given time and budgetary constraints?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Technical specification</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **During Implementation** | Are the proposed changes being made as expected?  
| | Are residents still supportive of the changes? |
| **Assessing Impact** | Has the scheme reduced police reported crime and disorder?  
| | How does reported crime and disorder in this area compare to before the scheme?  
| | How does reported crime and disorder in this area compare to other similar areas for the same time period?  
| | Has the scheme reduced self-reported crime?  
| | Has the scheme reduced fear of crime?  
| | Has the scheme led to any additional benefits?  
| | Has the scheme led to any unintended consequences (both negative and positive)?  
| | Has any displacement or diffusion of benefits been seen for example:  
| | a change in other crime within the target area?  
| | a change in crime in any of the neighbouring areas?  
| | a change in offender modus operandi?  
| | Has the scheme been cost-effective?  
| | How well was the scheme implemented on the ground – which agencies were involved, who led the project?  
| | What problems emerged and how were these overcome? |
## Intervention: Secure parking facilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evidence Quality</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Based on single studies including before-after evaluation with unmatched control groups.</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Parking facilities can be a focal point for vehicle crime, with 9% of all vehicle crimes being committed in work or public parking facilities in 2017/18(^{60}). Improved security in parking facilities can assist to address this issue. Improvements to parking facilities consist of:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Orientation of parking bays;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lighting;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Pedestrian access;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Signage;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Landscaping;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Security patrols; and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• CCTV systems(^{61}).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime types reduced</th>
<th>Vehicle theft, anti-social behaviour.</th>
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</thead>
</table>

| Effect | In 2003 the Home Office measured the effectiveness of the Secured Car Park Award Scheme\(^{62}\) (now called The Park Mark Safer Parking Scheme). The scheme involved awarding ‘secured car park’ status to parking facilities that met the required standards in terms of security, with features such as levels of formal surveillance, lighting, access control and physical appearance being found to be useful in reducing the levels of vehicle crime within existing high crime parking facilities. It was also found that applying these standards to the construction of new parking facilities also led to low crime levels. In addition to the reduction of vehicle crime within Secured Car Parks, the study found that improving parking facilities to the Secured Car Park Award standard increased use of the parking facilities and also reduced fear of crime in these areas. |

| How it works | Secured parking facilities reduce crime by: |

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\(^{62}\) Smith et al, ibid
Increasing the effort: Controlling access to and from parking facilities can prevent theft of motor vehicles
Increasing the risks: Improving surveillance through patrols and CCTV can deter offenders by increasing the likelihood of apprehension
Reducing the rewards: Off-street parking can prevent opportunist vehicle crime from occurring. By turning public space into private space, offenders will not be able to find plausible reasons for being in this area when challenged

| Costs & benefits          | The 2003 study\(^{63}\) found that improvements to parking facility security would provide significant benefits, namely:
|                           | • Parking would be safer and more secure, with fewer losses to car owners from thefts of and from vehicles, and damage to vehicles.
|                           | • Safer and more attractive parking facilities would be used more, increasing revenue from parking charges, and leading to more business for local businesses |

| Practical considerations   | This intervention is suitable for areas with high levels of vehicle crime (or fear of crime) within existing parking facilities, or for areas considering the construction of new parking facilities. |

### Implementation lessons

| Getting Started\(^{64}\) | The following questions should be asked:
| Nature of the problem     | • Is vehicle crime (or fear of crime) an issue in local car parks?
|                           | • How are the crimes being committed? What is the MO of offenders?
|                           | • Are the crimes opportunistic or planned?
|                           | • What is the occupancy level of the car park? Is it used? |

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\(^{63}\) Smith et al, ibid
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consultation</th>
<th>Feasibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Is permission for the improvements necessary from other agencies?</td>
<td>- How much will the scheme cost?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Is planning permission required?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Is your funding time-limited?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Technical specification**

- Vehicles should either be parked in locked garages or on a hard-standing within the dwelling boundary. In high crime areas, a gate or bollard may be required to protect the hard-standing parking area. However, caution should be taken to ensure that this is not the fire service emergency access route.

- Parking bays should ideally benefit from good ‘natural surveillance’; for example, being overlooked by the clear windows of public buildings and private dwellings. A location with good footfall is also desirable, to ensure there are sufficient people nearby who may notice suspicious activity and contact police. A bay in a secluded area or even one situated on its own within a traffic island site can be targeted heavily as there are no passing pedestrians who may notice a theft taking place. Surrounding buildings with opaque or transfer covered windows will also provide little benefit.

- Where communal parking areas are necessary, bays should be sited in small groups, close and adjacent to homes, be within view of active rooms and allocated to individual properties. The word ‘active’ in this sense means rooms in building elevations from which there is direct and regular visual connection between the room and the street or parking court. Such visual connections can be expected from rooms such as kitchens and living rooms, but not from more private rooms, such as bedrooms and bathrooms.

- Parking bays surrounded by vegetation or other obstructions (such as utility boxes) may provide cover for suspects to interfere with vehicles. An encroaching or uncontrolled undergrowth can hinder natural surveillance, restrict access for the car user, impact on the fall of light from nearby columns and can also hinder any CCTV coverage. Shrubs should be selected to have a mature growth height no higher than 1 metre; trees should have no foliage, shoots or lower branches below 2 metres, thereby allowing a 1 metre clear field of vision.
- Where parking is adjacent to or between units, a gable end window could be considered to allow residents an unrestricted view over their vehicles.

- Rear parking courtyards often provide access to vulnerable rear elevations of dwellings where the majority of burglary is perpetrated. In private developments such areas are often left unlit and therefore increase the fear of crime. Ungated courtyards provide areas of concealment which can encourage anti-social behaviour. Where rear parking courtyards are considered absolutely necessary, they must be protected by a gate that meets one of the following standards:
  
  - LPS 1175 Issue 7.2:2014 Security Rating 1; or
  - LPS 1175 Issue 8:2018 Security Rating 1 (A1); or
  - STS 202 Issue 7:2016 Burglary Rating 1; or
  - LPS 2081 Issue 1.1:2016 Security Rating A.

- Where gardens abut the communal parking area, an appropriate boundary treatment, e.g. a 1.5m fence supplemented by trellis to a height of 1.8m will assist with natural surveillance.

- Communal parking facilities must be lit to the relevant levels as recommended by BS 5489-1:2013 and a certificate of compliance provided.

### Basement and undercroft parking facilities

- Vehicle and pedestrian access should be kept to a minimum. Undercroft parking facilities that provide unrestricted access to the vehicles may require barriers or security screens around the perimeter to channel all legitimate users through dedicated vehicle and pedestrian entrances and exits.

- Inward opening automatic gates or roller grilles must be located at the building line or entrance to undercroft parking or at the top of ramps for basement parking facilities to avoid the creation of a recess. They must be capable of being operated remotely by the driver from the vehicle and the operation speed of the gates or shutters shall be as quick as possible to avoid tailgating by other vehicles. This will allow easy access by a disabled driver and should satisfy the
requirements of the Highways Department who under normal circumstances do not permit vehicles to obstruct the pedestrian footway whilst the driver is unlocking the gate.

- Automatic gates or roller shutters must be certificated to one of the following minimum security standards:
  - LPS 1175 Issue 7.2:2014 Security Rating 1; or
  - LPS 1175 Issue 8:2018 Security Rating 1 (A1); or
  - STS 202 Issue 7:2016 Burglary Rating 1; or
  - LPS 2081 Issue 1.1:2016 Security Rating A.

- Automated gates supplied and installed must meet the relevant statutory safety standards and be CE marked accordingly. Specifiers may wish to satisfy themselves that installers of powered gates are appropriately qualified, trained and follow recognised industry guidance. The following organisations provide guidance and training for installers:
  - Door Hardware Federation – the DHF has a revised Code of Practice (DHF TS 011) designed to raise standards of powered gate safety. Gates installed to the new Code of Practice will be inspected by the NSI;
  - Gate Safe – The Gate Safe organisation produces operational good practice guidance designed to raise standards in this industry sector.

- Lighting must be at the levels recommended by BS 5489-1:2013.

- Walls and ceilings should have light colour finishes to maximise the effectiveness of the lighting as this will reduce the luminaires required to achieve an acceptable light level. Reflective paint can reduce the number of luminaires needed to achieve the desired lighting level and reduce long-term running costs.

- Any internal doors that allow access to the residential floors must have an access control system.
All basement and undercroft parking facility specifications must be agreed with the Fire Safety Officer.

**Keyless ignition vehicles**

- Keyless ignition systems come with a fob which when kept in close proximity to the receiver inside the vehicle, transmits a signal to the car's computer system which when validated, allows the car to be unlocked, started and driven away. Faraday bags prevent the transmission of the signal between the fob and the vehicle.
- Drivers of keyless ignition vehicles are advised to put their keys into a Faraday bag to prevent the signal being intercepted by potential car thieves.

| **During Implementation** | • What are potential users’ views of the changes being made?  
• Are the improvements being carried out as expected? Are there any problems? |
|---------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
| **Assessing Impact**      | • Was a decrease in crime observed after the changes were implemented?  
• Can changes in crime be compared to a similar parking facility where improvements were not made?  
• Were there any changes in the fear of crime levels after the improvements were made?  
• Did the occupancy level of the parking facility increase after the improvements were made? |

Click to return to response summary list  Response
### Intervention: Moped, scooter, motorcycle and cycle parking

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evidence Quality</th>
<th>Limited</th>
<th>Based on case studies only.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Description**  | Sidebottom (2012) identifies two different interventions relating to cycle parking that could potentially reduce cycle theft<sup>66</sup>. These are:  
- Interventions intended to improve the security of cycle parking facilities. These can take several forms, reflecting the specific characteristics of different cycle theft problems. For example, in areas where cycle parking facilities suffer from poor visibility, attempts have been made to improve natural surveillance either by increasing the flow of passers-by or through the (re)positioning of businesses such as taxi ranks. The rationale for such schemes is that offenders will be less likely to offend in areas where their (perceived) likelihood of being spotted is high.  
- Interventions which seek to improve how cyclists lock their cycles. This is typically through the use of education campaigns informing cyclists of recommended practices concerning the types of locks to use and the manner with which they should be applied. |
| **Crime types reduced** | Cycle theft (both motorcycles and cycles). |
| **Effect**        | **Effect of moped, scooter and cycle parking**  
Sidebottom (2012) states ‘While success stories are available, much of the evidence indicating the success of schemes is weak and anecdotal. Systematic evaluations are rare but necessary for the future to determine ‘what works’<sup>67</sup>. As a result, there is little empirical evidence upon which to evaluate the effectiveness of the interventions described above. |
| **How it works**  | The interventions detailed above reduce cycle theft by:  
- **Increasing the risks:** Interventions that increase surveillance of cycle parking areas can increase the risk of an offender being identified and apprehended.  
- **Increasing the effort:** Enhanced security in the form of locks or cycle parking facilities will make it harder for cycles to be stolen. |

<sup>67</sup> Sidebottom, A. (2012) ibid
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Costs &amp; benefits</th>
<th>• No costs or benefit information is provided within the literature reviewed.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Practical considerations</td>
<td>• Is cycle theft a problem within the area?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is this intervention appropriate?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Implementation lessons

### Getting Started

The following questions should be answered prior to implementation:

- What is the nature and extent of cycle theft within your chosen area?
- What is the method used to steal cycles?
- Where are cycles stolen from?
- Which intervention/group of interventions would appear to be most relevant given your analysis of the offender *modus operandi* (above)?

### Consultation

- Is support required from partner agencies in order to implement your initiative(s)? If so, has this been secured?

### Feasibility

- Is the implementation of the identified initiative(s) possible given timescales and budgetary constraints?

### Technical specification

Mopeds, scooters and motorcycle parking
Parking for motorcycles is often provided in small on-street bays, delineated by a simple painted line. These bays often attract high rates of theft owing to the opportunities they offer criminals. Ground anchors and/or metal support stands provide a primary point for securing motorcycles, around which other secondary measures can be added by the rider, such as disc locks, grip locks, bike covers to one of the following security standards:

- Sold Secure Gold;
- STS 501.

Motorcycle parking bays can be made more secure by the installation of ground anchors, or robust metal support stands running at the side of adjacent paving. They provide a firm and immovable object to affix the rear wheel of a motorcycle. Ground anchors should be installed at the rear of motorcycle parking bays near to the kerb line and relatively flush to the road surface to prevent them being a trip hazard and meet one of the following security standards:

- Sold Secure Gold;
- STS 503.

If metal support stands are provided, these should consist of galvanised steel bars (minimum thickness 3mm), filled with concrete, with minimum foundation depths of 300mm with welded anchor bars.

Signage should be used to alert riders and advise them to use the ground anchors or support stands provided along with their own security hardware. All of the above issues could also be considered at dedicated parking facilities if a motorcycle bay is installed into an existing site.

Cycle parking

Cycle parking within blocks of flats should be easily accessible, with floor to ceiling dividing walls, no windows and be fitted with a secure doorset that meets the same physical specification as a ‘front door’. This will ensure that such stores
are only accessible to residents. The locking system must be easily operable from the inner face by use of a thumb turn to ensure that residents are not accidentally locked in by another person.

External containers specifically designed for the secure storage of cycles must be certificated to one of the following minimum security standards:

- LPS 1175 Issue 7.2:2014 Security Rating 1 (or above); or
- LPS 1175 Issue 8:2018 Security Rating 1/A1 (or above); or
- STS 202 Issue 7:2016 Burglary Rating 1 (or above); or
- LPS 2081 Issue 1.1:2016 Security Rating A; or
- Sold Secure (Bronze, Silver or Gold).

Where cycle storage is provided in a robust shed, the minimum requirements for the shed construction and security are as follows:

- 38x50mm (min) planed timber frame;
- Floor and roof constructed from 11mm boards (minimum);
- 11x125mm (min) Tongue & Grooved board walls and door;
- No window to be present;
- Door hinges should be coach-bolted through the shed structure or secured with security or non-return screws;
- Two hasp and staples that meet ‘Sold Secure’ Silver should be used. One positioned 200mm - 300mm down from the top of the door, and one positioned 200mm - 300mm up from the bottom of the door. Additionally, hasp and staples should be coachbolted through the shed structure or secured with either security or nonreturn screws;
- Both padlocks should meet ‘Sold Secure’ Silver or LPS 1654 Issue 1.1:2014 Security Rating 1 standard padlocks to be used;
- Securely fixed to a suitable substrate foundation.

A guide to marking cycles to prevent theft can be found [here](#).
If mopeds, scooters, motorcycles or cycles are to be stored within the shed then a security anchor shall also be certificated to one of the following:

- LPS 1175 Issue 8:2018 Security Rating A1

Security anchors should be securely fixed to suitable foundations in accordance with the manufacturer’s specifications. This also includes wall mounted anchoring systems.

External, open communal cycle stores with individual stands or multiple storage racks for securing cycles should be as close to the building as possible, but in any event within 50 metres of the primary entrance to a block of flats and located in view of active rooms of dwellings. The word ‘active’ in this sense means rooms in building elevations from which there is direct and regular visual connection between the room and the street or parking court. Such visual connections can be expected from rooms such as kitchens and living rooms, but not from more private rooms, such as bedrooms and bathrooms.

The store must be lit at night using vandal resistant, light fittings and energy efficient LED lights.

NB. Vertical cycle racks can be difficult for some sections of the community to use.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>During Implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Is the implementation of the identified initiative(s) proceeding as planned?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Are they any issues arising that may prevent the program of work being completed?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Assessing Impact | - Are you prepared/do you have the necessary data to be able to compare cycle crime after the initiatives have been implemented?  
- Will the before and after time periods be directly comparable? For example, will you be able to control for time of year?  
- Will you be able to compare the proportions of crime committed by day and by night?  
- Will you be able to compare before and after crime trends in your neighbourhood with those in nearby neighbourhoods?  
- Will you examine possible displacement and diffusion of benefits?  
- Will you try to estimate the cost-effectiveness of the initiative(s) used? |
# Intervention: Youth Shelters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evidence Quality</th>
<th>Limited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Based on case studies only.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Description | A youth shelter is a structure designed to meet the social needs of young people - a sheltered place to sit and talk. Sports equipment could be included, and a litter bin is often available to help keep the area tidy. The roof provides shelter from the weather, but most shelters are open on all sides, enabling all round visibility, ‘natural policing’ and safety for users. The most successful shelters are those that are linked to some type of sporting facility - these complement each other by becoming a place to go for both physical and social activity. Variations on ball games and various ‘wheeled sports equipment’ are always popular and it is vital to fully involve users of all ages in selecting their preferred equipment for this and future generations. |

| Crime types reduced | Burglary (and anti-social behaviour). |

| Effect | No literature has been identified that provides details of the effect of youth facilities on crime. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How it works</th>
<th>Youth facilities reduce crime by:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increasing the risk: By ensuring that youth facilities are subject to surveillance, the risk of an individual being observed and identified whilst committing a criminal act is increased.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Costs &amp; benefits</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A case study of specially designed sports and recreation facilities for youths in Banbury, Oxfordshire, found that each unit cost £40000 to install (1997 prices), but this was offset by a reduction of the costs of repairing young children’s play areas of £1000/year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Burnley, Lancashire, a three-sided youth shelter was built in a park area, at a cost of £12000 (2002 prices). Nuisance behaviour was subsequently reduced and vandalism to play equipment was reduced from £580/year to £70.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Practical considerations | Do the range of interventions/activities proposed address the crime problem? |

---


70 Ibid
Is this intervention appropriate?

## Implementation lessons

### Getting Started
The following questions should be considered prior to implementation:
- Is there a crime problem in the area under consideration?
- What crimes are being committed?
- How do the offenders access properties – what is their *modus operandi*?
- How do offenders target these properties?
- What is the potential cost of improvements?
- Have residents been consulted about potential improvements to properties and are they supportive?
- Are the proposed changes feasible given time and budgetary constraints?

### Consultation
- Have relevant stakeholders been consulted about the changes and are they in agreement?

### Feasibility
- Are the changes to the built environment feasible given time and budgetary constraints?

### Technical specification
- These must be subject to surveillance but sited so that local residents will not suffer from possible noise pollution. Care should be taken to ensure that a lone dwelling will not be adversely affected by the location of the amenity space and it should be noted that positioning amenity space to the rear of dwellings can increase the potential for crime and complaints arising from increased noise and nuisance.
- They should be designed to allow natural surveillance from nearby dwellings with safe and accessible routes for users to come and go.
- Boundaries between public and private space should be clearly defined and open spaces must have features which prevent unauthorised vehicular access.
- In addition, they should be sited in such a way that those using adjacent foot and cycle paths will not be subject to harassment or otherwise be put in fear.
These areas should ideally be designed so that they can be secured at night. This is to reduce the amount of damage and graffiti that occurs after dark.

The type of fencing and security measures will need to vary to suit the particular area. However, consideration should be given to a single dedicated entry and exit point.

A practical guide to youth shelters can be found [here](#).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>During Implementation</strong></th>
<th><strong>Assessing Impact</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Are the proposed changes being made as expected?</td>
<td>Has the scheme reduced police reported crime?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are residents still supportive of the changes?</td>
<td>Has the scheme reduced self-reported crime?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has the scheme reduced fear of crime?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has the scheme led to any additional benefits?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has the scheme led to any unintended consequences (both negative and positive)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has a reduction in crime led to an increase in other crime within the target area?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has the reduction of crime within the target block led to an increase in crime in the neighbouring area?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has the scheme resulted in a change in offender <em>modus operandi</em>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has the scheme been cost-effective?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How was the scheme implemented on the ground – which agencies were involved, who led the project?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What problems emerged and how were these overcome?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Click to return to response summary list  Response
### Intervention: Neighbourhood/Community Wardens

| Evidence Quality | Limited  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Based on case studies only.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Description

Neighbourhood Wardens aim to improve the quality of life by providing a uniformed presence in residential areas. Wardens promote community safety, contribute to community development and assist with environmental improvements and housing management. They are the ‘eyes and ears’ of the police, local authority and community.  

Wardens are usually employed by the local authority or housing associations and can fulfil a range of key functions through different methods. These include crime prevention (through mobile patrols, identifying design improvements and promoting neighbourhood watches), environmental improvements (through work as resident caretakers, providing information to residents on maintenance services and liaising with agencies), housing management (through checking empty properties and visiting tenants) and community development (through promoting residents’ associations, organising activities and consulting with residents over services)\(^{71}\).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime types reduced</th>
<th>Anti-social behaviour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

#### Effect

Neighbourhood Wardens can contribute to neighbourhood policing. Although there is limited evidence specifically of the impact of Neighbourhood Wardens on crime, evidence from an evaluation of PCSOs\(^{72}\) suggest they can have an impact on fear of crime and on youth disorder. In addition, evidence suggests that neighbourhood policing initiatives\(^{73}\) in general can:

- reduce public perceptions of disorder
- increase trust and confidence in the police
- increase the perceived legitimacy of the police and
- reduce victimisation

#### How it works

Neighbourhood/community wardens reduce crime by:

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\(^{71}\) NRU 2002, Neighbourhood and Street Wardens’ Programme


77
Increasing the risk by extending and strengthening formal surveillance.

**Costs & benefits**
In 2004 the salary for a neighbourhood warden in an example area ranged between £13,000 and £18,000.

**Practical considerations**
Is this intervention appropriate?
- Is there funding for the ongoing maintenance of a neighbourhood warden role?

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**Implementation lessons**

**Getting Started**
The following questions should be considered prior to implementation:
- Who will recruit and employ the wardens?
- What training will the wardens require?
- What will the role description include?
- Who will manage the wardens?
- How will the wardens interact with policing, local authority departments such as housing and other stakeholders?

**Consultation**
- Have residents and the property owners been involved in the design of the warden scheme?
- Have other relevant stakeholders been consulted on the job description?
- Have representative steering groups been set up?

**Feasibility**
- Is the recruitment and retention of wardens feasible given time and budgetary constraints?

**Common Features of Successful Neighbourhood Warden Schemes**

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74 Coward and Etherington (2004) Neighbourhood wardens: more than “eyes and ears” of communities Research report 60, Sheffield Hallam University
https://extra.shu.ac.uk/ndc/downloads/reports/RR60.pdf
Tailored and flexible approaches which are responsive to context, and able to respond to lessons as they are learnt. Such schemes demonstrated cultures of learning, where wardens, managers and partner agencies communicated well with one another from the outset.

Involvement of a wide variety of stakeholders in scheme design, including the police, local authority and housing authority staff and residents to ensure that schemes are based on a sound understanding of the problems and shared objectives.

Resident participation, from scheme design, through implementation, and in monitoring and evaluation. Adequate support and a variety of techniques are essential, for example ensuring that residents are active partners in steering groups, maintaining consultation throughout implementation, and resident participation in monitoring and evaluation.

Active and representative steering groups. These should include key stakeholders and residents, have adequate support to be able to function effectively and meet on a monthly or bi-monthly basis.

Consistent scheme management, with attention paid to reducing turnover of managers and staff, and with mechanisms to ensure the smooth running of the scheme in the event of such turnover.

Supportive management is highly valued by wardens and is key to maintaining morale and scheme success in terms of impact.

Ability to develop and nurture partnerships which are productive for all partners. Features of case study schemes with strong partnerships include regular contact, good reporting and feedback systems between partners, information sharing, joint initiatives between partners and grassroots contact.

Ability to maximise wardens’ visibility, using their resources effectively, and recognising that visibility is not just a matter of the intensity of patrolling, but of patrolling where and when the warden is likely to be seen and to provide a reassuring presence. Perceived visibility was enhanced by ongoing awareness campaigns, high profile publicised activities and targeted action in some case study schemes.
- Targeted approaches. The benefits of these approaches were found to help in supporting the elderly and young people. Such approaches could be applied to other groups, such as BME groups and asylum seekers.

### During Implementation
- Are the wardens undertaking the expected role?
- Have wardens been appropriately trained?
- Are wardens engaging effectively with local stakeholders and partners?
- Are residents involved and still supportive of the wardens?

### Assessing Impact
- How well was the scheme implemented on the ground? Which agencies were involved? Who led the project?
  - What problems emerged and how were these overcome?
- Has the scheme reduced demand in terms of police reported crime and disorder?
  - How does reported crime in this area compare to before the scheme?
  - How does reported crime in this area compare to other similar areas for the same time period?
  - Has the scheme reduced police calls for service in the area compared to other similar areas or to the period before the scheme?
- Has the scheme reduced fear of crime?
- Has the scheme led to any unintended consequences (both negative and positive)?
- Has any displacement or diffusion of benefits been seen? For example:
  - an change in other crime within the target area?
  - an change in crime in any of the neighbouring areas?
  - a change in offender modus operandi?
- Has the scheme been cost-effective?

Click to return to response summary list  **Response**
**Intervention: Neighbourhood Watch**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evidence Quality</th>
<th>Strong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Based on systematic review evidence.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Description | Neighbourhood Watch schemes grew out of a movement in the 1960s and promote the involvement of citizens in activities that promote safety or assist with the prevention of crime. They are known under a variety of different names including ‘home watch’, ‘block watch’ and ‘community watch’. Neighbourhood Watch schemes can be conducted as a stand-alone intervention, or as part of the ‘big three’, consisting of Neighbourhood Watch, property marking and security surveys. |

| Crime types reduced | Burglary (but some evidence suggests that these schemes can also reduce other ‘street’ crimes). |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall, the evidence suggests that neighbourhood watch can reduce crime. There are however some important considerations, such as variation in practices across schemes, and large differences between countries in terms of observed reductions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The review estimated that overall, for every 100 crimes, an average of 26 crimes were prevented with Neighbourhood Watch (based on 18 studies). There was no evidence of a backfire effect (where crime increases) across the evaluations reviewed. The review noted that neighbourhood watch schemes appeared to be more effective in the US studies, with an average of 47 crimes prevented per 100 crimes, compared with the UK, where an average of 15 crimes were prevented per 100 crimes. |

From analysis of CSEW data for 2000, there is additional evidence that living in a NW area has an 11% residential burglary reductive effect for resident households, especially for vulnerable households, all other things being equal. Also, burglaries fell between 1997 and 2007/08 more in NW areas than others. |

The evidence within the systematic review relates predominantly to a period before social media so it is important to be aware that the methods and impact may be affected by the potential of improved communication channels. |

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76 Bennett et al (ibid)
77 Bennett et al (ibid)
**How it works**

Neighbourhood Watch works by:
- **Increasing the risks**: Residents have greater awareness of suspicious activity and are more likely to report this to the police.
- **Reducing opportunities**: Neighbourhood Watch schemes may encourage activities that increase signs of activity in residential areas, discouraging offenders from entering properties when residents appear away.

**Costs & benefits**

No cost/benefit information is supplied in the literature reviewed.

**Practical considerations**

Is this intervention appropriate?

Reviews of Neighbourhood Watch schemes suggest that they can be appropriate for areas with low, medium or high crime rates, although the emphasis on specific activities can differ according to the crime rate in the local area:

- **Low crime**: A commitment to adhere to a set of standards, such as reporting suspicious behaviour and phoning the police after an offence has been committed. These schemes only require a ‘passive’ involvement from the police.
- **Medium Crime**: Maintenance of existing schemes in terms of fundraising events and liaising with local partner agencies to ensure that crime does not increase. It is also important that any evidence of criminal activity, such as vandalism, is promptly addressed. The police should be actively involved with multi-agency working and provide appropriate crime data.
- **High Crime**: Neighbourhood Watch schemes in high crime areas should be focussed on increasing community control and decreasing tolerance of crime. There is a clear need for multi-agency working and strong community co-ordinators. The police may need to take the lead in implementing Neighbourhood Watch schemes in these areas.

**Implementation lessons**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Getting Started</th>
<th>Nature of the problem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What is the crime rate in the target area? What crimes are being committed?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

The following questions should be considered prior to implementation:

- What levels of fear of crime exist in the target area?
- Do you have a similar area to act as comparison group in your evaluation?

**Consultation**
- Which partner agencies need to be involved in the scheme?
- Can you identify a local resident to act as the Neighbourhood Watch co-ordinator?
- Which activities (e.g. community meetings) need to occur?

**Feasibility**
- Is your plan feasible given time and budgetary constraints?

**Technical specification**
- Neighbourhood Watch provide specialist advice, support and guidance, such as toolkits, training and resources to people who want to develop an active Neighbourhood Watch including in areas of high crime and high social disadvantage, ensuring inclusion of under-represented communities and those who may otherwise be isolated. For more information about establishing a neighbourhood watch, please see [www.ourwatch.org.uk](http://www.ourwatch.org.uk) or you can contact enquiries@ourwatch.org.uk

**During Implementation**
- Is the scheme working as anticipated?

**Assessing Impact**
- What differences in crime rates can be measured between the two areas?
- What differences in fear of crime can be measured between the two areas?
- Were there any issues with the scheme? If so, how/were they resolved?
- Were any lessons learned from the process?
## Intervention: Targeted interventions for repeat victims

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evidence Quality</th>
<th>Strong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Based on systematic review evidence.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Description

Repeat victimisation is defined as ‘when the same person or place suffers from more than one incident over a specified period of time’. It can be caused by either ‘flagging’, whereby a victim is identified as being attractive to offenders, or by the likelihood of further victimisation being ‘boosted’ by an initial criminal act. With regard to burglary offences, specific addresses can be flagged to offenders as high-gain targets, and the likelihood of repeat victimisation is boosted by the knowledge of layout and belongings obtained after commission of the first burglary offence. This is also true of those houses very nearby and of similar design “near repeats” with the risk being highest in the initial period after the first offence.

The process by which repeat victimisation is addressed is as follows:

- Identification of properties that are at risk of repeat burglary
- Implementation of one or more of the following tactics:
  - Target hardening: A tactic whereby properties are made more secure;
  - Cocoon Watch (otherwise known as ‘cocooning’ or ‘super cocooning’): The provision of crime prevention advice and guidance to neighbours of burgled properties;
  - Property marking: Marking of property to enable easy identification if stolen;
  - Security surveys: Tailored crime prevention advice from crime reduction staff.

### Crime types reduced

Domestic burglary.

### Effect

**Effect of interventions for repeat victims**

A systematic review of 22 repeat domestic burglary prevention evaluations in Australia (six studies), the United States (three studies) and the UK (13 studies) showed a significant reduction in burglary repeat victimisation, with the UK programmes generally showing greater effects than the US and Australian studies.

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83 Pease, 1998; Shaw and Pease, 2000
84 Johnson and Bowers, 2004
85 Grove, L. ibid
Studies that evaluated cocooning as a single intervention found the following:

- A study conducted in Manchester found that creating a 400-metre buffer around homes reporting domestic burglary and subjecting these areas to enhanced police reassurance patrols for three weeks, resulted in a 26.6% reduction in burglary compared with the 12 months prior to the intervention\textsuperscript{86}.
- Western Australia Police piloted an 8-month targeted burglary prevention initiative which involved distribution of crime prevention leaflets to burglary victims and their immediate neighbours within 48 hours of the offence. The pamphlet was distributed by a combination of mail and in person-visits. Results showed a significant decrease in the likelihood of near-repeat burglary within 0-5 days and 1-200m from the target address\textsuperscript{87}.
- A 12-month study of the effect of cocooning visits by Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) to provide crime prevention advice to victims of burglary in Thames Valley was conducted in 2013/2014. The study involved visits to approximately 26 houses nearest to the target address being attended, with leaflets left if the homeowner was not present. Results from this study showed a statistically significant reduction in repeat burglaries after the intervention was implemented compared with a similar time period prior to this\textsuperscript{88}.

### How it works

Interventions targeting repeat victims work by:

- **Increasing the effort**: Target hardening tactics increase the effort required to commit burglary at identified properties.
- **Increasing the risk**: Heightened awareness of suspicious activity by residents increases risk of detection.

### Costs & benefits

- Costs will be dependent on the types of tactics used. A cost:benefit ratio of £1:£2.53 is reported in the Thames Valley cocooning study\textsuperscript{89}.

### Practical considerations

- Different tactics (or combinations of) may be more effective depending on the socio-economic composition of the target area and existing security measures. A detailed analysis of offending data (including method of entry) will provide a useful indication of potentially valid tactics.

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\textsuperscript{89} Weems, J. ibid
## Implementation lessons

### Getting Started

The following questions should be considered prior to implementation:

### Nature of the problem

- Choosing relevant areas for the tactic:
  - Which area will receive the crime reduction tactic chosen?
  - How will the success of the chosen tactic be measured? Has a comparable area been identified?

- Understanding the issue & potential solutions:
  - What proportion of the burglaries are being committed by prolific offenders and what proportion by occasional ones?
  - How persistent are the prolific offenders over time?
  - How does the offender know about, find, or encounter the target?
  - How does the offender get away?
  - How does the offender dispose of stolen goods?
  - How many offenders are involved in the commission of each offence?
  - How do the offenders learn how to commit burglary?
  - How do they pick target dwellings?
  - How do they decide what to steal?
  - How are the burglaries committed?
  - Are the burglars specialists in domestic burglary or are they generalists?
  - How far do the burglars travel to commit their crimes, and how do they get to burglary locations?
  - Are there special needs lying behind the decisions to commit burglaries?
  - Are there distinctive attributes of those committing the burglaries?
  - Are the burglars using special MOs?

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- How good is the surveillance and how good are the conditions for surveillance?
- What is drawing offenders to the target or area?
- How do MOs vary by location in which the burglaries are taking place?
- Do the proposed tactics address the issues highlighted in the questions above?

- **Project management**
  - Is there a systematic structure in place for monitoring progress?
  - Is there a process to manage victim referrals into the scheme?

**Consultation**
- Are key staff (e.g. local police officers) aware of the scheme and the referrals process?
- If the scheme involves a number of agencies, have relevant agreements been reached in terms of roles and responsibilities?

**Feasibility**
- Is it feasible to implement your chosen interventions given time and budgetary constraints?

**Technical specification**
- No technical specifications are available. For details of projects that have involved schemes to address repeat burglary victimisation, please see the attached reference list.

**During Implementation**
- Is the referral process working as anticipated?
- Is the intervention being offered/delivered to the appropriate people?
- If a number of separate tactics are being offered to eligible households, is the eligibility criteria being adhered to?
- Are the measures identified acceptable to householders or is there resistance to the proposed tactics?

**Assessing Impact**
- Has the program or tactic been implemented as expected?
- Has a reduction in the number of repeat burglaries been observed in the areas receiving the intervention(s) compared to areas that did not?
- Have there been any changes in the nature of offending that can be attributed to the interventions implemented?
## Intervention: Property Marking

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evidence Quality</th>
<th>Limited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Based on single studies using either before-after evaluation, or non-equivalent control group design.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Description       | Property marking involves adding the house number and postcode to items of property, therefore making it easier for these items to be returned to the relevant householder if stolen. Property marking can be carried out by the use of ultraviolet pens, security tags, RFID devices, or microdot solutions (solutions containing a uniquely coded digital signature). |

| Crime types reduced | Burglary, cycle theft. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Studies that evaluated the effectiveness of property marking found the following:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• A study conducted in South Wales in 1983[^91] involved visits to target properties by crime prevention officers, who provided advice and assistance to mark items using marker pens containing ink that was only visible under Ultra Violet (UV) light. Stickers were also supplied for residents to place in their windows which advertised that property in the address was marked. A comparison of the number of burglaries committed 12 months before the scheme commenced, with 12 months after showed a statistically significant (40%) reduction.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• A study carried out in Western Australia in 2015[^92] compared areas which did not receive property marking advice with an area which received a property marking kit consisting of ink containing unique identifiers, warning labels and window stickers. This study found a significant reduction in the number of burglaries in the area receiving property marking kits compared to the control area. However, the authors recommended that over 80% saturation of the property marking kits needed to be achieved for the intervention to be effective. In addition to this, property marking needs to be clear and evident to the potential offender.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

A study conducted in 5 London Boroughs using liquid property marking, and the provision of window stickers found a significant reduction in domestic burglary when compared with a control group within the same Borough. No significant crime or offence displacement was noted\(^93\).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How it works</th>
<th>Property marking works by:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Reducing the rewards:</strong> Items marked with postcodes will be easier to trace and harder to sell. Signage which notifies offenders that property is security marked can also deter theft.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Costs & benefits | The South Wales study concluded (based on 1983 prices)\(^94\) that if the scheme prevented 15 or more burglaries in the target areas, then the scheme would be cost-effective. |

| Practical considerations | Property marking has been shown to be most effective when over 80% of local residents mark their property\(^95\), so areas with a low uptake (such as student areas) may not benefit from this approach. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Getting Started</th>
<th>Nature of the problem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| The following questions should be answered: | • What is the burglary rate in the target areas? Is there a problem to address?  
• Is there a problem with domestic burglary?  
• What types of goods are being stolen?  
• How does the offender dispose of stolen goods? |

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| consider prior to implementation | • Can areas that receive the property marking intervention and areas that do not be identified (for the purposes of evaluation)? Are these comparable? |
| Consultation | • How will the property marking kits be distributed?  
• Who will be responsible for distributing the property marking kits?  
• Which property marking kits will be used? (see technical specifications, below)  
• Will property be marked by the staff attending the address or will the resident do it? |
| Feasibility | • Is the plan feasible given time and budgetary constraints? |
| Technical specification | • Technical specifications for property marking can be found [here](#) |
| During Implementation | • If the resident is responsible for marking property, will a follow up visit be required to check compliance? |
| Assessing Impact | • Is there a reduction in burglary offences before and after the intervention was implemented?  
• Is there a reduction in burglary in the area that received the property marking kits compared to the area that did not (the control area)? |

Click to return to response summary list  Response
### Intervention: Publicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evidence Quality</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Based on single studies employing before/after data with or without unmatched control groups.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>One technique of Situational Crime Prevention revolves around the removal of opportunities to commit crime. This can be achieved through changes to the physical environment, or by influencing offender perceptions of potential risks and opportunities. Publicising crime prevention activities is a potentially effective method of reducing crime by influencing offender perceptions.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime types reduced</th>
<th>Domestic burglary.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Four different types of publicity were identified within 21 Reducing Burglary Initiative projects carried out in the North of England. These could be categorised as follows:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|        | **General publicity**  
|        | o Uncontrolled publicity:  
|        | ▪ Radio interviews, newspaper articles, television appearances (local/national)  
|        | o Controlled publicity:  
|        | ▪ Leaflets/letters/cards, posters, publicity directed at offenders (e.g. Christmas cards), stickers (neighbourhood watch/property marking), community meetings, informal information to community/offenders.  
|        | **Stand-alone publicity campaigns**;  
|        | **Surveys** (including fear of crime, alley-gating, target hardening);  
|        | **Other** (any other form of publicity). |

Analysis of the crime reduction effect of the identified projects showed that.

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Schemes running publicity campaigns prior to the implementation of the burglary reduction initiative reported that rates of burglary started to fall before the initiative was rolled out, suggesting that publicity was at least partly responsible for the observed reduction in crime.

Schemes that spent more per household on advertising showed larger burglary savings than those that had spent less.

Four of the five most cost-effective schemes implemented stand-alone publicity campaigns.

### How it works

Publicity reduces crime by:

- **Increasing the risks**: Publicity can influence offenders' perceptions of risk and reward, discouraging criminal activity on the basis that apprehension is more likely.

### Costs & benefits

Data collected as part of the 2003 evaluation of the Reducing Burglary Initiative stated that the average costs of a stand-alone publicity campaign was £17900\(^99\).

### Practical considerations

**Is this intervention appropriate?**

- Do the range of interventions/activities proposed address the crime problem?
- Is a standalone publicity campaign appropriate, or should this be implemented as part of a wider combination of crime prevention initiatives?

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**Implementation lessons**

### Getting Started

The following questions should be considered prior to implementation:

- What type of publicity is appropriate for the location and the audience?
- Who will design and produce the publicity material?
- When should the publicity be delivered in relation to other interventions being implemented?
- How long should the publicity campaign run for?
- Are the messages in the publicity clear?
- Has the publicity been tested on the target audience?

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\(^99\) Bowers & Johnson, ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Consultation</strong></th>
<th>• Is consultation with stakeholders necessary? If so, have relevant individuals/groups been identified and consulted?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Feasibility</strong></td>
<td>• Is the proposed publicity campaign feasible given time and budgetary constraints?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Technical Specifications</strong></td>
<td>• No technical specifications have been identified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **During Implementation** | • Is the publicity material as specified?  
• Is the publicity campaign being delivered to the agreed target audience in the manner expected? |
| **Assessing Impact** | • If the publicity material is delivered ahead of other interventions has the possibility of anticipatory benefits been considered for the analysis of data?  
• Has the scheme reduced police reported crime?  
• Has the scheme reduced self-reported crime?  
• Has the scheme reduced fear of crime?  
• Has the scheme led to any additional benefits?  
• Has the scheme led to any unintended consequences (both negative and positive)?  
• Has a reduction in crime led to an increase in other crime within the target area?  
• Has the reduction of crime within the target block led to an increase in crime in the neighbouring area?  
• Has the scheme resulted in a change in offender *modus operandi*?  
• Has the scheme been cost-effective?  
• How was the scheme implemented on the ground – which agencies were involved, who led the project?  
• What problems emerged and how were these overcome? |
Bibliography


Armitage (with UCL) (Sidebottom, Armitage and Thompson, in press)


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NRU 2002, Neighbourhood and Street Wardens’ Programme


https://whatworks.college.police.uk/Research/Systematic_Review_Series/Pages/Alley_gating.aspx


